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I. INTRODUCTION
Even the Justices considering Strickland v. Washington knew.
“[T]his is a big case,” Justice Powell handwrote on the first page of his
law clerk’s bench memorandum for Strickland v. Washington.1  In-
deed, it was2—and is.3  In 1984, the Supreme Court for the first time
decided who is an “effective” criminal defense attorney for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment.4  Specifically, the Court held that a defendant
receives constitutionally unacceptable representation when (1) coun-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas-Fayetteville School of Law.
1. Memorandum from Mark E. Newell to J. Powell (June 2, 1983) (on file with the
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Lewis Powell Papers).
2. E.g., Linda Greenhouse, High Court Defines ‘Ineffective’ Counsel as a Basis for
Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1984, at A14.
3. E.g., Elizabeth Gable, Wiggins v. Smith: The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Standard Applied Twenty Years After Strickland, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 755,
770 (2004).
4. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 702 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sel’s representation falls below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness that (2) prejudiced the defense, and therefore had an effect on the
judgment.5
From the time of its publication, the decision received mixed re-
views.6  Since then, Strickland has remarkably been relied on by
courts nationwide to uphold as constitutional criminal defense attor-
ney conduct that includes sleeping through portions of a trial,7 re-
maining completely silent during the proceedings,8 mental illness,9
alcohol use,10 and drug use.11
With those results in mind, Strickland has steadily endured com-
plaints from the media,12 the bar,13 and scholars alike.14  But no arti-
cle has looked back to ask a more basic question: Why?  Why did the
Court spend 1956–1969 expanding indigent access to justice—particu-
larly in the right-to-counsel area—only to aggressively reverse course
in Strickland?  And a related question: Why did the opinion’s author,
Justice O’Connor, go so far as to apply the new Strickland standard to
the facts of David Washington’s case?
This Article makes two arguments: First, that Strickland is best
understood as a backlash case—a case designed to radically recede
from the Warren Court’s more broadly conceived Sixth Amendment.
By coalescing the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, the
Fifth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause, the Warren
Court issued a number of rulings that dramatically expanded indigent
defendants’ right to counsel.  Creating the Warren Court’s vision of
that broadly conceived right took six years—from 1961–1967.  But,
once complete, the Warren Court’s right to counsel included access not
only to attorneys at trial, in the interrogation room, at lineups, and on
appeal—among other procedural phases—but it also extended more
generally to things an attorney might need, like a trial transcript.
5. Id. at 687.
6. Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New
Paths—A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 94 (1986).
7. E.g., McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
8. United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1986).
9. Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1987).
10. People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989).
11. Young v. Zant, 727 F.2d 1489, 1492–93 (11th Cir. 1984); People v. Badia, 159
A.2d 577, 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
12. E.g., Alan Berlow, Lose That Lawyer, SLATE (June 3, 2008, 4:04 PM), http://
www.slate.com/article/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2008/06/lose_that_law
yer.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/X3LG-NUVH.
13. E.g., Robert M. Andalman, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Under the
Wisconsin Constitution, 67 WIS. LAWYER, Feb. 1994, at 14, 17.
14. E.g., Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Inef-
fective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of
Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1259, 1272–81 (1986).
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Yet, significant changes in Court personnel beginning in 1972 cor-
respondingly altered the Supreme Court’s views about indigent de-
fendants’ access to justice.  By the time of Strickland in 1984, Warren
Court holdovers Brennan, White, and Marshall were overrun by new
and differing views about both indigent access to counsel and, most
importantly for this Article, what counsel must do in order to be
“effective.”
Second, this Article asserts that by applying the new Sixth Amend-
ment standard to the facts in Part V of Strickland, Justice O’Connor
undermined—perhaps deliberately—what could have been a standard
far more demanding of defense attorneys.  She did so in part by buck-
ing an established Supreme Court practice that favors remanding new
Supreme Court standards to lower courts in criminal procedure
cases.15 Strickland’s true problem is, therefore, not the standard for
effective assistance, but rather the fallout from the Supreme Court’s
decision to apply that standard.
This Article proceeds in two parts.  Part II traces the Warren
Court’s effort to establish a broad and robust right to counsel as it
emerged in the 1960s.  Part II then transitions to Strickland and ex-
plores how a majority of the Court concluded that an experienced at-
torney who felt “hopeless” about the chances of saving his client’s life
nevertheless provided constitutionally competent defense representa-
tion.  To collectively do so, Part II considers the social and judicial cli-
mates leading up to 1984 and reviews the Justices’ private Strickland
papers, the Court’s exchange of Strickland-related memoranda, and
the parties’ briefs and oral arguments.
Part III then argues that Strickland’s backlash against the Warren
Court’s view of the right to counsel is best seen in the last section of
the Strickland opinion.  In Part V of Strickland, Justice O’Connor fas-
cinatingly concluded that David Washington received effective assis-
tance from his trial attorney, William Tunkey, despite her colleagues’
vote at the Conference following oral argument to simply remand.  A
detailed look at the analytical assertions in Part V, alongside Justice
O’Connor’s voting history in right-to-counsel cases, explains why she
sought—on her own—to undo the Warren Court’s approach to the
right to counsel.  Properly understanding Strickland in this broader
historical context reveals new and previously undiscovered reasons for
the current Court to demand more from criminal defense
representation.
15. Elise Borochoff, Lower Court Compliance with Supreme Court Remands, 24
TOURO L. REV. 849, 854–55, 895–96 (2008).
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II. THE STRANGE RIGHT-TO-COUNSEL JOURNEY
The journey to Strickland follows a non-linear path that, at best, is
dark and poorly marked.  This Part seeks to clarify Strickland’s ori-
gins and, in doing so, thematically proposes that the result in Strick-
land was preordained, in large part because a change in Court
personnel brought with it a change in the Court’s attitude toward the
Sixth Amendment.  Section II.A explores the impact of the Supreme
Court’s composition on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the
years preceding Strickland.  Building on section II.A, section II.B ex-
plores the Strickland opinion itself in more depth.
A. The Journey to Strickland
The right to counsel exists in the Sixth Amendment, which pro-
vides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”16  On June
6, 1983, the date upon which the Supreme Court granted the State’s
writ of certiorari in Strickland,17 the strength of the Sixth Amend-
ment’s right to counsel diminished.  Some historical context is neces-
sary to understand how.
At the time of its ratification in 1791,18 the Sixth Amendment was
understood to minimally provide a criminal defendant with the right
to retain a private attorney.19  A more difficult question loomed for
more than a century: Does the Sixth Amendment require state gov-
ernments to provide an attorney when the defendant cannot afford
one?20
The Court’s ambivalence about the contours of the right to counsel
came to a sharp halt in 1953, following the appointment of Earl War-
ren as Chief Justice.  Indeed, according to one commentator, “The
[Warren Court] decisions with the greatest significance are clearly the
right-to-counsel cases.”21  From the time of Warren’s appointment un-
til his retirement in 1969,22 the Court steadily and dramatically ex-
panded the right to counsel by thematically prioritizing “the
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17. Docket, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (No. 82-1554).
18. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 46 (2004).
19. Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amend-
ment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 438–39 (1993).
20. History of Right to Counsel, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, http://www
.nlada.org/About/About_HistoryDefender (last visited July 20, 2015), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/X4GU-5EYT.
21. A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV.
249, 258 (1968); accord Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment,
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 495–96 (2009).
22. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  PRINCI-
PLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 8 (4th ed. 2010).
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fundamental right of access to justice . . . .”23  Indeed, rather than
focusing on the Sixth Amendment’s text to expand the right to coun-
sel, the Court, during Warren’s tenure, focused more broadly on the
concept of equality—that is, an equal opportunity for defendants to
construct a defense.24  To do so, the Warren Court relied not only on
the Sixth Amendment, but also on broadly conceived notions of due
process and the Equal Protection Clause.25
The Warren Court’s controversial fusing of the Sixth Amendment,
Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause
made a powerful impact on the rights of indigent criminal defendants.
To begin with, the Court decided Griffin v. Illinois in 1956, which
guaranteed to indigent defendants a free copy of their trial transcript
for purposes of appeal.26 Griffin’s seemingly innocuous holding hardly
appears the poster child for the so-called Warren Court’s individual
rights “revolution,”27 and, perhaps as a result, it generated little
commentary.28
Thus, to many, the formally termed “Warren Court” did not begin
until 1961, when the Court decided Mapp v. Ohio, which applied the
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.29  Ironically, by 1961, the Warren Court had
firmly established itself as far more than just controversial.  Indeed,
the Court, by that time, had endured outlandish claims that its mem-
bers were Communists,30 weathered attacks from Congress,31 and
withstood criticism from J. Edgar Hoover32—among other detrac-
tors.33  The Court’s decision in Mapp served only to further fuel the
23. Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (2013).
24. See Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Crimi-
nal Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV.
359, 393 (2001).
25. E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–58 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
26. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.
27. Leonard W. Levy, Introduction to THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 4
(Leonard W. Levy ed., 1972).
28. See David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 845 (2007).
29. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
30. Nadine Strossen, Freedom of Speech in the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT:
A RETROSPECTIVE 68, 79 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996).
31. E.g., 104 CONG. REC. 954 (1958).
32. See J. Edgar Hoover, The Law and the Layman: Faith in the Courts Must Be
Preserved, 44 A.B.A. J. 1155, 1157–58 (1958).
33. See, e.g., H.R. 11477, 85th Cong. (2d Sess. 1958); Bill Becker, Attack on Warren
Boomerangs on Anti-Reds School on Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1961, at 58.
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critics,34 and more than sporadic claims emerged seeking impeach-
ment of Chief Justice Warren, along with several Associate Justices.35
What Mapp was to the Fourth Amendment in terms of grandiose
and stature, the Supreme Court’s 1963 ruling in Gideon v. Wain-
wright was to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.36  Though sub-
stantially less controversial, Gideon’s holding was nonetheless
momentous—promising counsel at state expense to indigent defend-
ants charged with a felony.37  Writing for the majority on March 18,
1963, Justice Black reasoned, “[A]ny person haled into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel
is provided for him.”38  Moreover, Justice Black added, “The right of
one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”39
Gideon, unlike Griffin, drew attention from both the media and le-
gal commentators alike.40  If Gideon was not a clear manifestation of
the Warren Court’s intent to expand and strengthen the right to coun-
sel, the Court then decided Douglas v. California.41  Remarkably, on
the same day as Gideon, a majority of the Court relied on the Four-
teenth Amendment to conclude that Gideon entitles indigent defend-
ants to counsel at state expense in order to prosecute their first
appeals as of right.42
One year later, in Massiah v. United States,43 the Supreme Court
returned to the Sixth Amendment to further expand the right to coun-
sel.44  In Massiah, the Court held that the “petitioner was denied the
basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him
at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal
agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted
and in the absence of his counsel.”45 Massiah’s narrow impact—appli-
cable only to post-indictment interrogations—hardly stemmed the ris-
34. E.g., Leonard E. Ryan, Narcotics Case Convictions Drop Since Ban on Illegal
Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19. 1962, at 35.
35. ‘Impeach Earl Warren’ Sign Posted on Highway Upstate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
1963, at 36.
36. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see e.g., Justin Marceau, Gideon’s
Shadow, 122 YALE L.J. 2482, 2485–86 (2013).
37. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.
38. Id. at 342–45.
39. Id.
40. E.g., Justice Mitchell D. Schweitzer, The Rationing of Justice, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
183, 184 (1965) (book review); Anthony J. Lewis, Supreme Court Extends Ruling
on Free Counsel: Holds States Must Provide Lawyers for All Poor in Serious Crim-
inal Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1963, at A1.
41. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
42. Id.
43. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
44. Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2472 (1996).
45. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
308 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:302
ing tide of Warren Court criticism.46  Indeed, many viewed Massiah
simplistically, as yet another case designed to expand the rights of
criminal defendants.47
Further expansion of the Sixth Amendment, or so it initially ap-
peared, came that same year when the Court decided Escobedo v. Illi-
nois.48  After police arrested Danny Escobedo for the murder of his
brother-in-law, Escobedo requested counsel.49  When officers began
interrogating Escobedo, his lawyer arrived and requested permission
to see him.50  Those requests were denied, and Escobedo made incrim-
inating statements.51  He argued before the Supreme Court that his
incriminating statements should have been suppressed at trial be-
cause officers unconstitutionally denied him access to his lawyer.52
The Supreme Court agreed, holding in part that the collective circum-
stances surrounding Escobedo’s interrogation denied him “ ‘[t]he As-
sistance of Counsel’ in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution.”53
Although the law enforcement community,54 alongside the judici-
ary,55 largely disapproved of Escobedo, criticism of the Warren Court
had yet to peak.  In 1966, two years after Massiah, the Court issued
Miranda v. Arizona.  In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the
Fifth Amendment required the prosecution to provide a defendant
with “procedural safeguards” before using “statements, whether excul-
patory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation . . . . ”56
Those procedural safeguards are the now familiar Miranda warnings,
which in part require that “an individual held for interrogation must
be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and
to have the lawyer with him during interrogation . . . . ”57  Put differ-
46. See James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel
Against Informants: Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 5 (1988).
47. E.g., Daniel Gutman, The Criminal Gets the Breaks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1964, at
SM36 120–21.
48. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
49. LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 29 (1983).
50. People v. Escobedo, 190 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ill. 1963), rev’d sub nom. Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
51. BAKER, supra note 49, at 30.
52. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 483–84.
53. Id. at 491 (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)).
54. E.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 391–92
(2000).
55. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 202 A.2d 669, 678 (N.J. 1964); Commonwealth v. Negri,
213 A.2d 670, 676 (Pa. 1965); Wamsley v. Commonwealth, 137 S.E.2d 865, 868
(Va. 1964).
56. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
57. Id. at 471 (emphasis added).
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ently and more directly, the Warren Court created a Fifth Amendment
right to counsel.58
Critics came from all around to chastise the Court.59  The New
York Times characterized the Miranda decision as providing “immu-
nity from punishment for crime on a wholesale basis.”60  Shortly after
Miranda, Truman Capote testified before a Senate subcommittee and
asked, “Why do they seem to totally ignore the rights of the victims
and potential victims?”61  Even Richard Nixon made his criticism well
known on the campaign trail during the 1968 presidential election.62
To the frustration of still others,63 the Supreme Court’s 1964
“landmark”64 decision in Malloy v. Hogan ensured that Miranda’s
Fifth Amendment right to counsel would apply to the states.65
Notwithstanding unrelenting criticism, the Warren Court pressed
on in 1967.  In a trio of cases, United States v. Wade,66 Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia,67 and Stovall v. Denno,68 the Court extended the right to coun-
sel for indigent defendants to lineup identifications.  In Mempa v.
Rhay, it held the right to counsel applies at sentencing.69  Unlike the
Court’s reliance on the Fifth Amendment in Miranda, it read the
Sixth Amendment as broadly applicable to both cases70—a reading
that was “hardly a foregone conclusion.”71
Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of the Court in Wade, spe-
cifically relied on the Sixth Amendment to hold that defendants are
entitled to counsel during pretrial proceedings whenever necessary to
ensure a fair trial.72  Like Wade, the Court emphasized the impor-
58. E.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More!: The Implications of the Informed Citi-
zen Ideal for Discovery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 709, 730 (1999).
59. SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 239
(2010).
60. Arthur Krock, In the Nation: The Wall Between Crime and Punishment, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 1966, at 46.
61. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERI-
CAN BILL OF RIGHTS 234 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. See, e.g., The New Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1969, at 46; JAMES MAC-
GREGOR BURNS, PACKING THE COURT: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND THE COM-
ING CRISIS OF THE SUPREME COURT 202 (2009).
63. E.g., Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court Moves Again to Exert Its Powerful Influence,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1964, at E3.
64. Privilege Ruling: Justices Widen Scope of Fifth Amendment in State Actions, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 1964, at A1.
65. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
66. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
67. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
68. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
69. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
70. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226–27; Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272; Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134.
71. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.1(a) (3d ed. 2000).
72. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227.
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tance of counsel in Mempa;73 as Justice Marshall wrote,
“[A]ppointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of
a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused
may be affected.”74
Although Congress sought in 1968 to legislatively overrule both
Miranda and Wade,75 the Warren Court declined to retreat from ei-
ther holding.  Instead, although it would not issue another right-to-
counsel opinion, the Warren Court completed its tenure by continuing
to expand indigent rights in a trio of 1969 opinions.76  By the time
Chief Justice Warren Burger filled Warren’s position on June 23,
1969,77 the Supreme Court had replaced the case-by-case right-to-
counsel approach established by Betts v. Brady78 in 1942 with a right
to counsel at state expense for indigent defendants in felony cases,79
lineups,80 the interrogation room,81 post-indictment,82 and at sen-
tencing.83  So intense was the Warren Court’s influence by the end of
its term that President Eisenhower was rumored to say that his deci-
sion to appoint Warren was “one of the two biggest mistakes I made in
my Administration.”84
The transition to the Burger Court was significant.  Some scholars,
however, maintain that the Burger Court’s impact was blunted by its
failure to overrule even one of the so-called Warren Court trilogy—
Gideon, Mapp, and Miranda.85  That view, though correct, overlooks
the Burger Court’s ability to limit or, in some instances, wholly stop
expansion of the Warren Court’s right to counsel in felony cases, line-
ups, the interrogation room, and sentencing.  To begin with, the Bur-
ger Court’s route to halting Gideon began slowly—and only after a trio
73. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 133–34.
74. Id. at 134.
75. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501(a)–(b), 3502 (Supp. IV, 1968), invalidated by Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
76. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); Williams v. Oklahoma City,
395 U.S. 458, 458 (1969); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 370–71 (1969).
77. Linda Greenhouse, Warren E. Burger Is Dead at 87; Was Chief Justice for 17
Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1995, at A1.
78. 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
79. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
80. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967).
81. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
490–91 (1964).
82. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
83. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967).
84. JACK HARRISON POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA 200
(1979).
85. E.g., Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The
Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory
Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 62, 68
(Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
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of cases that seemed to guard the Warren Court’s right to counsel.86
Then came Argersinger v. Hamlin.87  Argersinger, an indigent defen-
dant, was charged with an offense punishable by six months in prison,
a $1,000 fine, or both.88  He was unrepresented during a bench trial
where a judge found Argersinger guilty and sentenced him to ninety
days in jail.89  The Court reversed Argersinger’s conviction, holding
that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be im-
prisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”90  In doing
so, the Court reasoned that “[t]he assistance of counsel is often a req-
uisite to the very existence of a fair trial.”91
The Argersinger decision initially looks like an expansion of
Gideon.  The circumstances surrounding Gideon’s issuance in 1963,
however, suggest otherwise.92  At that time, Chief Justice Warren pri-
oritized producing a unanimous Court at the expense of clarifying
Gideon’s reach.93  Accordingly, he proposed his colleagues “leave to
another day and other decisions whether the states were required to
provide counsel in misdemeanor trials or for appeals.”94  Viewed
against that historical anecdote, Argersinger limited Gideon by declin-
ing to hold that indigent defendants are entitled to counsel for misde-
meanor trials.  Indeed, by tying the right to counsel to actual
imprisonment,95 the Burger Court not only limited Gideon’s reach,
but also left open the possibility that a defendant might, in some
cases, be entitled to a jury trial, but not to counsel.96
The Burger Court’s backlash against Gideon grew more pro-
nounced with the passage of time.  In 1973, the Court held that indi-
gent defendants are not automatically entitled to state-appointed
86. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446–49 (1972); Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S.
473, 483 (1972); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
87. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
88. Id. at 26.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 31.
92. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 379 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 405 (1997).
94. Id.  It is, of course, difficult to reconcile this statement with the fact that the
Court handed Douglas down on the same day as Gideon.  Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963).
95. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40.
96. Defendants are entitled to jury trials when charged with offenses punishable by
greater than six months of imprisonment.  Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69
(1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160–62 (1968).  When Argersinger re-
fused to adopt a similar approach in the right-to-counsel context, it left open the
possibility that a defendant might receive a jury trial for offenses punishable by
greater than six months, but have no lawyer to assist him should his punishment
exclude imprisonment. Scott, 440 U.S. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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counsel at parole revocation hearings.97  Then, in 1974, it pointedly
declined to extend the right to counsel to discretionary appeals beyond
first appeals as of right.98  Five years later Scott v. Illinois solidified
Argersinger’s holding that no indigent defendant be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment without counsel.99
More precise validation about the recession from Gideon came from
a majority of the Burger Court itself in 1975.  In Faretta v. California,
the Court held that the Sixth Amendment implies a right of self-repre-
sentation—that is, the right not to have a lawyer’s assistance at
trial.100  In doing so, the Court candidly acknowledged, citing Gideon:
There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused to conduct his
own defense seems to cut against the grain of this Court’s decisions holding
that the Constitution requires that no accused can be convicted and impris-
oned unless he has been accorded the right to the assistance of counsel.101
By 1981, no further confirmation of the Burger Court’s right-to-
counsel direction was needed.102  But cutting back on Gideon and its
implications was hardly the only item on the Burger Court’s right-to-
counsel agenda prior to Strickland.  In particular, the right to counsel
at lineups—an area expanded under the Warren Court103—is perhaps
the best illustration of Burger Court cutbacks.
In 1973, the Court, in Kirby v. Illinois, held that Wade’s right-to-
counsel rule applied only after the commencement of judicial criminal
proceedings; thus, pretrial lineups conducted without counsel present
and prior to formal charging do not violate the Sixth Amendment.104
In further evisceration of Wade one year later, the Court, in United
States v. Ash, concluded that the right to counsel did not apply to a
photographic lineup, even if that display was presented to the witness
after defendant’s indictment.105  More than stop the Warren Court’s
expansion, Professor Yale Kamisar concluded that the Burger Court
“virtually demolished” the right to counsel at lineups in what “may
well be the saddest chapter in modern American criminal proce-
dure.”106  The Burger Court similarly cut back on the Miranda right
to counsel.  In 1971, the Burger Court limited Miranda’s ability to ex-
clude uncounseled statements.107  In Harris v. New York, the prosecu-
97. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
98. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
99. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74.
100. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
101. Id. at 832.
102. Accord Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 32–33 (1981).
103. See David A. Sonenshein & Robin Nilon, Eyewitness Errors and Wrongful Convic-
tions: Let’s Give Science a Chance, 89 OR. L. REV. 263, 266 (2010).
104. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690–91 (1972).
105. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973).
106. Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retro-
spective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 29–30 (1995).
107. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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tion sought to introduce uncounseled, incriminating statements at
trial to contradict defendant’s direct testimony.108  In permitting the
use of such statements as impeachment evidence, the Court reasoned,
“Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as indi-
cating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any purpose, but
discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to the Court’s holding
and cannot be regarded as controlling.”109
The Burger Court’s effort to limit Miranda’s right to counsel be-
came more direct three years later.  In Michigan v. Tucker, the defen-
dant sought to establish an alibi during police questioning; in
particular, he told police he was with Robert Henderson on the night
of the crime under investigation—a rape.110  The defendant was con-
victed after Henderson contradicted his story.111  He therefore argued
on appeal that Henderson should not have testified because law en-
forcement violated Miranda by not advising him during the initial in-
terrogation “that counsel would be appointed for him if he was
indigent.”112  The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction
by holding that the failure to inform him about his right to counsel
was “an inadvertent disregard . . . of the procedural rules” established
by Miranda.113  Thus, although the defendant’s statement was inad-
missible pursuant to Miranda, the fruit of that statement—Hender-
son, the witness—could properly testify.114
Collectively, Harris and Tucker dramatically undermined the War-
ren Court’s right to counsel; absolute exclusion of statements or the
fruits of those statements obtained in violation of Miranda was no
longer required.  Thus, as the Burger Court approached Strickland in
1984, it had successfully modified, halted, or retreated from every
facet of the Warren Court’s right to counsel, except in the post-indict-
ment context.115
B. Defining Who Is “Effective” Counsel
Despite the litany of Supreme Court right-to-counsel holdings, the
law prior to Strickland was unclear as to what constituted constitu-
tionally adequate criminal defense116—a question distinct from that
of when indigent defendants are entitled to counsel.  For example,
neither Gideon, nor Douglas—both of which provided indigent defend-
108. Id. at 223–24.
109. Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
110. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 436 (1974).
111. Id. at 436–37.
112. Id. at 435, 438–39.
113. Id. at 445 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 452.
115. E.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
116. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 683 (1984).
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ants with appointed counsel at different procedural stages—said any-
thing about the minimum quality of attorneys appointed to represent
clients during those procedural events.  The Supreme Court, for its
part, admitted that the issue presented in Strickland was novel.117
Enter David Washington.  While in a laundromat one day in Sep-
tember 1976, a minister named Daniel Pridgen approached Washing-
ton and asked him on a date in exchange for compensation.118
Although Washington agreed, he was incensed by the idea of a priest
engaged in homosexual behavior.119  He and an accomplice, Johnnie
Gary Mills,120 concocted a plan to kill Pridgen.121
On September 26, 1976, the pair went to Pridgen’s home, and Mills
lured Pridgen into homosexual activities.122  Once Pridgen was un-
dressed and in bed, Washington stabbed Pridgen to death, while Mills
held him down.123  The pair fled after stealing some items from
Pridgen’s home, including a small amount of cash, some jewelry, a .22
caliber pistol, and Pridgen’s automobile.124
Remarkably, Washington would kill two more times.  Three days
after killing Pridgen, Washington planned to rob a home owned by
Omer and Katrina Birk because he thought the Birks kept a substan-
tial amount of cash there.125  On September 23, 1976, Washington en-
tered the home of Katrina Birk, wearing a rag around his face to
disguise himself, and carrying rope, a knife, and a gun.126  Once in-
side, he instructed Birk and her three sisters-in-law, Ruth Pitzer, Ju-
lia Sullivan, and Georgia Griffith, to lie on the floor.127  Birk then
offered Washington the contents of a moneybox holding approximately
117. Id. at 686.
118. Joint Appendix at 3–4, Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (No. 82-1554).
119. Id. at 499.
120. Mills and Washington were friends, but were not related. Id. at 124.
121. Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1978).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.; Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 29.
125. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 199–200, 202–03.  Why Washington thought
that the Birks kept cash in their home is a matter not precisely clarified by the
record.  According to one investigating detective, Washington regularly stole tele-
visions from neighborhood homes and sold them to a Martin’s Furniture Store.
Id. at 200–01; see also id. at 499 (Washington told an examining psychiatrist he
“often sold stolen property to Mrs. Birk and her husband”).  When Mr. Martin did
not have sufficient funds to pay Washington, he would ask Mr. Birk to obtain
sufficient cash from his home to pay Washington. Id. at 200–01.  Washington,
however, was never charged with burglary or robbery in connection with the
detective’s allegations.  For his part, Washington said he knew the Birks because
of his work at the used furniture store and believed that the store obtained the
majority of its merchandise illegally. Id. at 33, 37.
126. Washington, 362 So. 2d at 660; Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 203, 208.
127. Washington, 362 So. 2d at 660; Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 34.
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$120 inside.128  When the pair thereafter got into a struggle, Wash-
ington stabbed Birk and then, using a towel as a silencer for his gun,
shot Birk once in the back of the head.129  After shooting and stabbing
the other three victims, Washington fled the home with the
moneybox.130  Two of the three sisters survived the assault,131 though
both sustained devastating and permanent injuries.132
Four days later, Washington contacted twenty-year-old Frank
Meli, a senior accounting major at the University of Miami—ostensi-
bly in response to Meli’s newspaper advertisement to sell his 1974
Camaro.133  Meli and Washington met the next day so Washington
could test drive the vehicle.134  Following the drive, Washington per-
suaded Meli to go to Washington’s home so that he could obtain the
money to pay for the car.135  Once at Washington’s home, he used a
knife to forcibly bind Meli to a bed.136  Two of Washington’s accom-
plices, Nathanial Taylor and Johnny Gary Mills,137 assisted Washing-
ton by preventing Meli’s escape.138  Washington then sold Meli’s car
and forced Meli to telephone his brother to seek a ransom.139
Two days later, on the morning of September 29, 1976, Washington
paid Taylor and Mills part of the proceeds from the automobile
sale.140  He then entered the bedroom where Meli remained captive
and stabbed him eleven times, as Meli recited the Lord’s Prayer.141
Washington left Meli clinging to life when Washington went to meet
Meli’s brother to obtain the ransom.142  Washington left their planned
meeting spot shortly after his arrival when he saw police nearby.143
He returned home to find Meli dead; Washington dug a shallow grave
128. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 88–89, 211, 217 (noting the total sum of $120).
129. Id. at 89, 214–15.  Washington used the weapon he stole from Pridgen in the Birk
murders. Id. at 217.
130. Washington, 362 So. 2d at 660.
131. Id. at 660–61; see Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1247 n.1 (5th Cir.
1982), rev’d, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
132. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 90, 171–72.
133. Washington, 362 So. 2d at 661; Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 39, 92; DAVID
VON DREHLE, AMONG THE LOWEST OF THE DEAD: THE CULTURE OF DEATH ROW 134
(1995).
134. Washington, 362 So. 2d at 661.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 38.  Nathanial Taylor is David Washington’s
stepbrother. Id. at 24, 69, 249.
138. Washington, 362 So. 2d at 661.
139. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 41, 95, 273.
140. Washington ultimately received $2,000 for the vehicle. Id. at 42.
141. Washington, 362 So. 2d at 661; Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 276–77,
317–18; DREHLE, supra note 133, at 134.
142. Washington, 362 So. 2d at 661.
143. Id.
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and buried Meli under a tree in his backyard.144  Washington’s dra-
matic crime spree lasted twelve days.145
Taylor and Mills, Washington’s accomplices, were arrested at
Washington’s residence on October 1, 1976.146  Washington then
turned himself in and confessed to killing Meli after waiving his Mi-
randa rights.147  Before signing his twenty-three-page sworn confes-
sion, Washington waived the presence of a lawyer by saying, “I don’t
need one if I told the truth.  I don’t need no attorney.”148  Washington
was indicted on October 7 for first-degree murder in connection with
Meli’s death and was appointed counsel.149
Counsel for Washington, a private attorney with substantial crimi-
nal defense experience named William Tunkey,150 advised Washing-
ton on several occasions not to speak further with anyone.151
Although Washington initially heeded this advice by denying his role
in the Birk and Pridgen killings,152 he ultimately confessed to killing
both victims.153
On November 17, Washington was indicted for first-degree murder
in connection with the deaths of Birk and Pridgen.154  All totaled,
Washington was charged with three counts of first-degree murder,
multiple counts of robbery, kidnapping for ransom, breaking and en-
tering and unlawfully assaulting persons therein, three counts of at-
tempted murder, and conspiracy to commit robbery.155  Washington
entered pleas of guilty and received three death sentences.156
The appellate road following Washington’s convictions is a long one
that spans six years and five published opinions.157  At issue in all but
the first of four appeals was whether Tunkey’s conduct during Wash-
144. Id.; Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 43.
145. DREHLE, supra note 133, at 254.
146. Washington, 362 So. 2d at 661.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at vii–1.
150. Tunkey received his J.D. in 1970 from the University of Florida. William R.
Tunkey Lawyer Profile, MARTINDALE.COM, http://www.martindale.com/William-R-
Tunkey/810580-lawyer.htm (last visited July 20, 2015), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/2NUA-BNSM.  He was admitted to the bar in May 1970, and practiced
as an Assistant State Attorney until 1973.  Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at
422.  Tunkey then moved into a private practice that focused on criminal trials
and appeals. Id. at 422.  Prior to representing Washington, Tunkey estimated he
had handled in excess of 1,000 criminal cases. Id. at 424.
151. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 26–27.
152. Id. at 141.
153. Id. at 122, 124–39, 259–60.
154. Id. at iv (providing chronological list of relevant docket entries).
155. Id. at 206–07.
156. Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 662 (Fla. 1978).
157. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Washington v. Strickland, 693
F.2d 1243 (1982) (en banc), rev’d, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984);
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ington’s sentencing hearing was constitutionally “effective.”  Richard
Shapiro, counsel for Washington during each post-sentencing proce-
dure, except Washington’s direct appeal, frequently pointed to six rea-
sons to demonstrate Tunkey’s ineffectiveness:
1. Tunkey failed to ask for a continuance to prepare for Washing-
ton’s sentencing hearing (there were five days between Wash-
ington’s change of plea and sentencing);
2. Tunkey failed to obtain a psychiatric or psychological evaluation
of Washington;
3. Tunkey failed to investigate and present character witnesses for
Washington;
4. Tunkey failed to request a presentence investigation;
5. Tunkey failed to present either a meaningful sentencing memo-
randum or closing argument;
6. Tunkey failed to cross-examine the State’s medical experts and,
additionally, failed to undertake an independent medical
examination.158
The case reached the Supreme Court five years after Washington’s
first direct appeal amidst federal habeas proceedings.159  By then,
Shapiro had already persuaded an en banc panel of Unit B of the Fifth
Circuit to remand Washington’s case to the district court.160  That dis-
trict court had, just months earlier, concluded that Tunkey “made an
error in judgment,” but that Washington failed to prove that the ab-
sence of Tunkey’s error would have changed the outcome.161  The
Eleventh Circuit held that the district court failed to make factual
findings relevant to whether Tunkey’s failures to investigate were
strategic and, if not, whether those failures were prejudicial.162  In
doing so, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that, “In many cases it will
not be clear whether the failure to investigate a line of defense is
based upon trial strategy or upon neglect of counsel’s professional
obligations.”163
With a remand of Washington’s case now final, neither the State,
nor Washington sought a rehearing on the en banc opinion.164
Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); Washington v.
State, 397 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1981); Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1978).
158. Brief of Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari Appendix at 218–29, Strickland, 466 U.S.
668 (No. 82-1554) (reflecting Shapiro’s list of issues during state habeas
proceedings).
159. Docket, Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (No. 82-1554) (showing Strickland’s petition for
writ of certiorari was received March 21, 1983).
160. Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1263.
161. Brief of Petitioner Appendix, supra note 158, at 282–83, 286.
162. Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1258–59.
163. Id. at 1257.
164. Brief of Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (No. 82-1554).
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Rather, the State filed its writ of certiorari seeking review by the
United States Supreme Court on March 21, 1983.165  In reviewing the
petition, Justice Blackmun wrote privately, “[A] grant seems unavoid-
able, given the clear conflict and the importance of the issues.”166  He
added: “[I]t is about time the Court gave more guidance about effective
assistance claims.”167  By a vote of 6–3, the Court granted the State’s
petition on June 2, 1983.168
Oral argument on Strickland took place on January 10, 1984,
before Chief Justice Burger and Associate Justices Brennan, White,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, and Marshall.169
Carolyn M. Snurkowski,170 arguing for petitioner Strickland, focused
primarily on the proper standard for evaluating attorney effective-
ness.171  But, with regard to Tunkey, she argued that Washington
said during his guilty plea hearing that he had “no complaints” about
him.172  Further, Snurkowski suggested any complaints about
Tunkey’s performance were more properly attributable to Washington
himself given that he “cut [Tunkey] off at the knees with regard to
presenting [the] case to a jury or to a judge . . . .”173
When Richard Shapiro began his argument on behalf of Washing-
ton, he was predictably more critical of Tunkey’s performance.  Sha-
piro focused less on the standard because, he said, “[I]t is essential to
point out what the District Court found as the reason for counsel’s
lack of investigation.”174  Shapiro emphasized that the district court
found “as a fact” that Tunkey “had a feeling that nothing could be
done to save Washington . . . .”175  That feeling, Shapiro stressed, “was
165. Docket, Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (No. 82-1554).
166. Justice Blackmun Handwritten Notes (May 29, 1983) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 401, Folder 9).
167. Id.
168. Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell, Justice
Rehnquist, and Justice O’Connor voted in favor of the petition.  Certiorari Voting
Record from Justice Powell (June 2, 1983) (on file with the Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Lewis Powell Papers).  Justice Stevens voted to hold the
petition; whereas, Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to deny. Id.
169. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668.
170. Carolyn Snurkowski currently serves as Assistant Deputy Attorney General in
Florida. Carolyn Snurkowski, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, FLA. DEPT. OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT, http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/Criminal-Justice-and-Ju-
venile-Information-Services/Menu/Council-Members/Carolyn-Snurkowski.aspx
(last visited July 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Z3X6-KRLQ.  A
1972 graduate of Florida State College of Law, she has argued six cases before
the Supreme Court, including Strickland v. Washington. Id.
171. E.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (No. 82-1554)
(“[T]he manner in which [the Eleventh Circuit’s] standard should be applied is up
for consideration.”).
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 9.
175. Id. at 9–10.
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behind [Tunkey’s] failure to do an independent investigation on peti-
tioner’s background and potentially mitigating emotional and mental
reasons for the killings.”176  Basically, Shapiro suggested that Tunkey
“failed to fulfill the basic responsibilities of an advocate”177 and thus
“failed to conduct an investigation out of a sense of hopelessness.”178
The Court decided Strickland v. Washington on May 14, 1984.179
Broken cleanly into five parts, Justice O’Connor, as the majority au-
thor, provided the case’s factual and procedural background in Part I,
followed by an overview of Sixth Amendment history in Part II.180  As
Part II wound down, Justice O’Connor wrote, “The benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s con-
duct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”181
Then, at the outset of Part III, the Court announced a standard that
one commentator would later say “permits the worst lawyering to pass
muster”:182
A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as
to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components.
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.  Second, the defendant must show that the deficient perform-
ance prejudiced the defense.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.  Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the
conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary pro-
cess that renders the result unreliable.183
Throughout Parts III and IV, the Court elaborated on both of the
standard’s components.  First, addressing how to evaluate when coun-
sel falls below an objective performance threshold, Justice O’Connor
indicated that “prevailing professional norms” help.184  Citing Ameri-
can Bar Association standards as an example, the Court noted that
counsel must maintain the duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts, a
duty to advocate the defendant’s cause, and a duty to “bring to bear
such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial
testing process.”185  But, Justice O’Connor cautioned, the standard is
“highly deferential,” and thus, “[A] court must indulge a strong pre-
176. Id. at 10.
177. Id. at 11.
178. Id. at 18.
179. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668.
180. Id. at 671–87.
181. Id. at 686.
182. William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 160 (1995).
183. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
184. Id. at 688.
185. Id. (citation omitted).
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sumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reason-
able professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”186
Objectively deficient attorney performance does not alone consti-
tute a Sixth Amendment violation.  Rather, the Court explained,
“[A]ny deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the
defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Consti-
tution.”187  On this point, the Court said, the defendant must show “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.”188  Finally, in
a nod toward efficiency, Justice O’Connor wrote that a reviewing court
could resolve an ineffective assistance claim on either the performance
or prejudice prong.189
Things got interesting in Part V when, contrary to the Court’s ini-
tial conference vote following oral argument,190 Justice O’Connor ap-
plied the new standard to the facts of Washington’s case.  She
explained Tunkey’s actions were constitutionally reasonable and, even
if unreasonable, could not have prejudiced the outcome of Washing-
ton’s sentencing hearing.191  As to the first part, Tunkey’s perform-
ance, Justice O’Connor wrote that Tunkey “made a strategic choice to
argue for the extreme emotional distress mitigating circumstance and
to rely as fully as possible on respondent’s acceptance of responsibility
for his crimes.”192
To support her conclusion on Tunkey’s performance, Justice
O’Connor made three observations.  First, she wrote that “[a]lthough
counsel understandably felt hopeless about respondent’s prospects,
see App. 383–384, 400–401, nothing in the record indicates, as one
possible reading of the District Court’s opinion suggests, see App. to
Pet. for Cert. A282, that counsel’s sense of hopelessness distorted his
professional judgment.”193  Second, to excuse Tunkey’s failure to ob-
tain either character evidence or have Washington undergo psycholog-
ical testing, she indicated that Tunkey “could reasonably surmise from
his conversations with respondent that character and psychological
evidence would be of little help.”194  Finally, and more precisely re-
lated to the absence of character evidence introduced at Washington’s
186. Id. at 689 (citation omitted).
187. Id. at 692.
188. Id. at 694.
189. Id. at 697.
190. Justice Powell, Conference Notes (Jan. 13, 1984) (on file with the Library of Con-
gress, Manuscript Division, Lewis Powell Papers).
191. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698–99.
192. Id. at 699 (emphasis added).
193. Id. (emphasis added).
194. Id.
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sentencing hearing, Justice O’Connor reasoned that “[r]estricting tes-
timony on respondent’s character to what had come in at the plea col-
loquy ensured that contrary character and psychological evidence and
respondent’s criminal history, which counsel had successfully moved to
exclude, would not come in.”195
Moving to the prejudice prong, Justice O’Connor said, “[T]he lack
of merit of [Washington’s] claim is even more stark.”196  For support,
she concluded that “[t]he evidence that respondent says his trial coun-
sel should have offered at the sentencing hearing would barely have
altered the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge.”197
At most, she found, the omitted character evidence “shows that nu-
merous people who knew respondent thought he was generally a good
person . . . .”198  As for the omitted psychological examination, Justice
O’Connor suggested, “[A] psychiatrist and a psychologist believed
[Washington] was under considerable emotional stress that did not
rise to the level of extreme disturbance.”199  Again highlighting the
absence of Washington’s “rap sheet,” she concluded that “admission of
the evidence respondent now offers might even have been harmful to
his case: his ‘rap sheet’ would probably have been admitted into evi-
dence, and the psychological reports would have directly contradicted
respondent’s claim that the mitigating circumstance of extreme emo-
tional disturbance applied to his case.”200
III. STRICKLAND ’S UNTOLD STORY
The Supreme Court’s conclusion that William Tunkey’s perform-
ance at sentencing was constitutionally competent is just the begin-
ning.  Part III tells the rest of the story: the untold facets of
Washington’s background and Tunkey’s performance.  Along the way,
it questions why Justice O’Connor did not, as her colleagues re-
quested, simply remand Strickland back to the lower court for applica-
tion of the majority’s standard to Washington’s case.  Section III.A
tests the analytical assertions made in Part V of the Strickland opin-
ion.  Doing so exposes how little Tunkey truly did during Washington’s
sentencing hearing and, correspondingly, what the Supreme Court
omitted from the Strickland opinion about Tunkey’s performance.
That, in turn, showcases why the majority’s conclusion that Tunkey’s
conduct was “effective” doomed the Strickland standard before lower
courts could even apply it for the first time.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 699–700.
198. Id. at 700.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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Section III.B digs deeper.  A look back at the Court’s private ex-
change of Strickland-related memoranda reveals just how controver-
sial the inclusion of Part V was amongst the Justices.  Perhaps in part
because of the Court’s hidden discord, section III.B argues that Part
V’s imprecise and often inaccurate analysis was not “useful to lower
courts,”201 as Justice O’Connor had hoped.  Rather, section III.B con-
tends, Part V weakened the Sixth Amendment by downgrading what
otherwise could have been a standard more demanding of defense at-
torneys.  Indeed, the unending slew of complaints about Strickland
might not exist had the Court simply remanded Strickland back to the
lower court.
But why didn’t Justice O’Connor include the factual details pro-
vided in section III.A about Tunkey’s performance?  Why didn’t she
write her first draft as her colleagues requested—to remand Strick-
land?  Section III.C seeks to provide the answer: Part V of Strickland
was the peak of a private war Justice O’Connor waged against the
Warren Court’s right to counsel.  Indeed, the combination of Part V of
Strickland, Justice O’Connor’s decision to ignore the Conference vote,
and her voting pattern in right-to-counsel cases up to that point in her
career suggests no other plausible alternative.
A. Part V’s Analytical Fallacies
Troubling analytical assertions pervade Part V of the Strickland
opinion.  Justice O’Connor, in Part V, made four primary assertions to
conclude that Tunkey provided constitutionally competent assistance
to Washington at his sentencing hearing.  First, she asserted
“[Tunkey] made a strategic choice to argue for the extreme emotional
distress mitigating circumstance and to rely as fully as possible on
respondent’s acceptance of responsibility for his crimes.”202  Second,
she suggested that nothing in the record “indicates . . . that counsel’s
sense of hopelessness distorted his professional judgment.”203  Third,
her opinion indicated that Tunkey could “reasonably surmise” that
“character and psychological evidence would be of little help.”204
Fourth, Justice O’Connor pointed with praise to Tunkey’s success in
excluding Washington’s rap sheet.205
A detailed examination of Strickland’s voluminous record reveals
that Tunkey’s sense of hopelessness about Washington’s case did, in
fact, affect his professional judgment.  Indeed, the record paints a
201. Letter from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to Justice William J. Brennan (Mar.
13, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William J.
Brennan Papers, Box 647, Folder 1(1)).
202. Id.
203. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699 (citation omitted).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 700.
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troubling picture that shows Tunkey (1) giving up on his own suppres-
sion motions; (2) failing to a seek a continuance to prepare for sentenc-
ing; (3) submitting a five-page sentencing memorandum with no
supporting citations; and (4) doing almost nothing at the actual sen-
tencing hearing, including during his closing argument.  Moreover,
the record reflects that Tunkey did not “reasonably surmise” that
character/psychological evidence would be unhelpful; rather, Tunkey
himself admitted he simply did not think of these topics.  And as for
the rap sheet, well, that did not even exist.
1. Tunkey’s Suppression Motions, Sentencing Memorandum, and
Performance at Sentencing
Early in the case, Tunkey moved to suppress Washington’s confes-
sions and certain physical evidence.206  But he abandoned those mo-
tions in a dramatic fashion when Washington appeared before the
trial court—against Tunkey’s advice—on December 1, 1976, to enter
guilty pleas.207  Before the formal change of plea hearing began,
Tunkey addressed the court by making what he called “several an-
nouncements.”208  As his remarks make clear, Tunkey, even at this
early stage, was actually giving up.  For instance, Tunkey inexplicably
tanked his own suppression motions:
I have filed in behalf of Mr. Washington motions to suppress the state-
ments, admissions, and confessions.  However, it is my considered judgment
that there was a free and voluntary waiver of counsel in each case. There was a
waiver of his various constitutional rights to remain silent, to the assistance of
counsel, et cetera.209
Tunkey was plainly wrong to abandon his motions to suppress
Washington’s confessions, in part because the circumstances sur-
rounding those confessions—particularly those surrounding Washing-
ton’s Miranda waivers—are conflicting or largely absent from the
record.  This facet of the Strickland story begins sometime either be-
tween 10:45–11:45 AM or 10:30 AM–2:00 PM on November 5, 1976.210
While Washington was incarcerated and awaiting trial for killing
Meli, two investigators, Detectives Major and Simmons, had an “ini-
tial conversation”211 with Washington about his involvement in the
206. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 164, at 13.
207. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 24, 400.  Washington initially pleaded not
guilty to all charges. Id. at 19.
208. Id. at 18.
209. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
210. Compare id. at 142 (providing testimony from Detective Major suggesting that he
was with Simmons for an interaction with Washington between 10:45–11:45
AM), with id. at 196–98 (including testimony from Detective Simmons suggesting
he was present with Detective Major from 10:30 AM–2:00 PM).
211. Id. at 142.
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deaths of Pridgen and Birk.212  Without mentioning or discussing the
role of Washington waiving Miranda,213 Detective Major explained
their interactions as follows:
After advising David Washington of his rights per the Miranda decision[,] I
advised David that he was suspected of both the Reverend Pridgen’s murder
and Katrina Birk’s murder; introduced myself as the lead investigator on the
Pridgen homicide and Detective Simmons introduced himself as the lead in-
vestigator on the Birk homicide.  We informed David that the investigation
was still continuing and that evidence would be worked that would . . . prove
that he in fact did kill Reverend Pridgen and Katrina Birk, and there was no
reason for him to attempt to lie to us.
We informed [him] that we spoke to Johnnie Mills and that we had learned
from Johnnie Mills of David’s involvement; that Mills was telling us that
David had told him about the murders.214
Washington responded by denying his role in both murders.215  Ac-
cording to Detective Majors, Washington also “grinned a little bit and
said that Johnnie Mills was lying to [sic] and that Johnnie Mills was
there also in that he took part in the Pridgen homicide.”216  Although
a suspect offering an incriminating statement or gesture after receiv-
ing Miranda warnings does not necessarily constitute a waiver,217
Tunkey’s decision to abandon his suppression motions meant that the
constitutionality of Detective Major’s interaction with Washington
was never challenged.
At 3:10 PM,218 after securing a written waiver of Washington’s Mi-
randa rights,219 investigators again questioned Washington—this
time for one to two-and-a-half hours220—during which time he con-
212. Id. at 141–42.
213. The sentencing transcript references a written waiver of Miranda for the Birk
homicide, but there is no discussion of how that waiver was obtained. Id. at 120.
Given that the issue was not litigated, this is not wholly surprising.  The issue of
how detectives obtained Washington’s Miranda waiver for the various interroga-
tions is repeated throughout the sentencing transcript. Id. at 197.
214. Id. at 142–43.
215. Id. at 141.
216. Id. at 144.
217. The law on Miranda waivers was particularly favorable to Washington at the
time of his interrogation. Miranda placed a “heavy burden” on law enforcement
to prove waiver of a suspect’s Miranda rights.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
475 (1966).  Only three years after Washington’s interrogation did the Supreme
Court issue North Carolina v. Butler, which recognized the possibility of an im-
plied Miranda waiver.  441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (“[I]n at least some cases waiver
can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.”).
218. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 119–20, 259–60.  The record frustratingly does
not clarify why the “initial conversation” ended, how the subsequent interaction
began, or what occurred in the time between the interrogations.
219. Id. at 120, 222.
220. Compare id. at 261 (suggesting the interrogation lasted two-and-a-half hours),
with id. at 122 (suggesting the interrogation lasted one hour).
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fessed to killing both Pridgen and Birk.221  Again, because Tunkey
abandoned his suppression motions, the question of whether an im-
properly secured waiver tainted the constitutional validity of Wash-
ington’s subsequent confessions was never litigated.222
Regardless, with Washington’s guilty plea entered, the focus
turned to sentencing.  Without Tunkey seeking a continuance to pre-
pare, Washington’s sentencing took place just five days later, on De-
cember 6, 1976.223  At the hearing, Florida law tasked Judge Richard
Fuller—the same judge who presided over Washington’s change of
plea hearing—with determining whether (1) a sufficient number of ag-
gravating circumstances supported a death sentence;224 and (2) an in-
sufficient number of mitigating circumstances existed to outweigh the
aggravators.225
Tunkey submitted a memorandum to the court prior to sentencing
that spanned five transcript pages and cited no cases.226  In that
memorandum, Tunkey conceded the applicability of two aggravating
circumstances (three in one of the murders) and, moreover, conceded
the inapplicability of four mitigating circumstances.227  Justice
O’Connor, though she incorrectly referred to the emotional distur-
bance mitigating circumstance as the “extreme emotional distress”228
mitigating circumstance, correctly recognized Tunkey argued that
221. Id. at 122, 124–39, 259–60.  Confusingly, another portion of the record suggests
Washington confessed to killing Meli at the time detectives searched Nathanial
Taylor’s home. Id. at 249–50, 257.
222. Although the law on Miranda’s exclusionary rule was hardly as favorable to
Washington in 1976 as was the law on waivers, it was minimally in flux.  See
supra note 217 and accompanying discussion.  In particular, the question of
whether a statement taken in violation of Miranda could thereafter taint another
statement remained an open one.  The Court did not take up that question until
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004).  Prior to Washington’s interroga-
tion, the Supreme Court had ruled only that statements taken in violation of Mi-
randa were admissible for impeachment purposes, see Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222, 226 (1971), and that a witness discovered from a statement taken in
violation of Miranda could testify at the defendant’s trial, see Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 452 (1974).  Stated more simply, Tunkey was wrong to tank his
suppression motions.  He could have at least advised Washington to enter a con-
ditional plea of guilt, conditioned upon the opportunity for Tunkey to argue his
suppression issues on appeal. See generally FLA. R. APP. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i)
(2014).
223. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 79 (providing date); Washington v. State, 362
So. 2d 658, 662 (1978) (providing sentence).
224. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(a)–(h) (1975).
225. FLA. STAT § 921.141(4)(a)–(h).  The list of aggravating circumstances has dramat-
ically expanded from eight factors to sixteen since 1975. FLA. STAT.
§ 921.141(5)(a)–(p) (2014).  The list of mitigating circumstances, however, has not
changed. FLA. STAT § 921.141(6)(a)–(h).
226. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 332–37.
227. Id. at 333–34.
228. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 699 (1984) (emphasis added).
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mitigating circumstance and highlighted that defendant pleaded
guilty—all in under two sentences.  Without even mentioning Wash-
ington’s troubled upbringing, Tunkey simply wrote:
[I]t is the contention of counsel for the Defendant that: a) the Defendant has
no significant history of prior criminal activity; b) the Defendant was acting
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time
that he committed the acts complained of in the above-styled cases, and; c)
that the Defendant’s age is such that a sentence of imprisonment for life in the
State Penitentiary with no parole for anywhere between 25 and 75 years, de-
pending upon whether sentence is rendered in the above-styled causes are
consecutive or concurrent, would both severely and adequately punish the De-
fendant for the crimes complained of and would insure society that the Defen-
dant would not ever again become a threat to the community.229
Tunkey also wrote that Washington freely admitted guilt and ex-
pressed a willingness to testify against his co-defendant, Gary
Mills.230  The idea that relaying these separate arguments with such
brevity was a matter of strategy is difficult to accept.
By contrast, to support its request for a death sentence and to
prove an appropriate number of aggravating circumstances, the State
introduced testimony from ten witnesses, including detectives,231 a fo-
rensic pathologist,232 and surviving victims233—among others.234
The State’s case spans more than two hundred pages of transcript,235
during which time it introduced nineteen different exhibits.236
Tunkey was then left to argue that a sufficient number of mitigat-
ing circumstances existed to save Washington’s life.  He did little.
During the State’s case, he cross-examined Detective Simmons simply
to confirm that Washington waived his Miranda right to counsel prior
to confessing,237 and he cross-examined Detective John Spiegel to es-
229. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 334–35.
230. Id. at 335–36.
231. Id. at 103–47 (direct examination of Detective Charles Major, lead investigator of
Pridgen’s murder); id. at 184–221 (direct examination of David L. Simmons, lead
investigator of Birk’s murder and attempted murder of Sullivan, Griffith, and
Pitzer).
232. Id. at 154–61 (direct examination of Elidio Fernandez, medical examiner who
performed autopsy on Pridgen).
233. Id. at 162–82 (direct examination of Pitzer, one of Birk’s sisters-in-law).
234. Id. at 223–29 (direct examination of Hubert Lawrence Rosomoff, neurosurgeon
who operated on one of the sisters-in-law); id. at 229–36 (direct examination of
Ronald Keith Wright, deputy chief medical examiner who conducted Birk’s au-
topsy); id. at 236–51 (direct examination of John Spiegel, lead investigator in
Meli’s murder); id. at 253–86 (direct examination of Charles Zatrepalek, police
officer who worked on Meli’s case); id. at 287–93 (direct examination of Harry Bill
Coleman, the man who sold the motorcycle); id. at 294–310 (direct examination of
Wright, who also performed autopsy on Meli).
235. Id. at 81–311.
236. Id. at 80–81 (listing exhibits).
237. Id. at 221–23.
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tablish that Washington did not act alone.238  But beyond a periodic
objection during the State’s case,239 Tunkey did not otherwise partici-
pate.240  He specifically declined to cross-examine the State’s medical
examiners on three occasions,241 a fact witness,242 and an investigat-
ing detective.243  When it came time to put on his own case, he de-
clined to do so, choosing instead to rely on the testimony given at the
plea hearing244 and the sentencing memorandum he submitted before
the hearing.245  Beyond that, in Tunkey’s words, “We will offer no ad-
ditional testimony at this time.”246
The proceedings reached closing arguments.  After the State made
its case for the death penalty, Tunkey briefly addressed the court to
request that it not impose the death penalty.247  Without connecting
his remarks to the governing statute’s mitigating factors, Tunkey said
the following:
I cannot tell the Court and I don’t know that the Court knows itself what
possesses any person, whether it is David Washington or anybody else, to
commit a series of acts like this, and yet the Court knows that he is a living
breathing human being with some degree of intelligence, with the ability to
express himself and even though, obviously, the acts which he committed
were atrocious or terrible he also possess[es] somewhere within him a spark
which is good, which is decent.
There are obviously others in the past who have come before judges about
to be sentenced for crimes as serious, perhaps more serious, who have been
given the opportunity one way or another to live out their lives, whether it be
in prison or after being in prison and back in society, who have been produc-
tive members of society, whether that be in a prison or elsewhere.  I suggest to
the Court that David Washington is not different when you go back and talk
about a Leopold and Loeb case or Birdman of Alcatraz case, somewhere within
this man, I suggest to the Court, there is a spark which deserves the chance to
expire naturally.
238. Id. at 252–53.
239. E.g., id. at 303 (objecting to the phrasing of the State’s question).
240. See, e.g., id. at 161 (declining to cross-examine the medical examiner who per-
formed Pridgen’s autopsy); id. at 175 (declining to cross-examine one of the sis-
ters-in-law and objected to the testimony of the other sister-in-law as cumulative
testimony); id. at 182–84 (cross-examining one sister-in-law solely about forgiv-
ing Washington and whether he should be “penalized by God’s laws or by man’s”);
id. at 221–23 (cross-examining only briefly the lead investigator of Birk’s homi-
cide, focusing on whether Washington expressed his desire to have an attorney
present); id. at 236 (declining to cross-examine medical examiner who performed
autopsy on Birk).
241. Id. at 229 (declining to cross-examine a neurosurgeon); id. at 236 (same); id. at
310 (same).
242. Id. at 293 (declining to cross-examine a witness who sold Washington a motorcy-
cle after the Meli killing).
243. Id. at 286 (declining to cross-examine Detective Charles Zatrepalek, who investi-
gated the Meli homicide).
244. Id. at 313.
245. Id. at 101.
246. Id. at 313.
247. Id. at 321.
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Whatever punishment he is going to receive in the hereafter, he is going to
receive, whether this Court gives him the death penalty or not.
I simply ask this Court not to interpose the judgment of the hereafter but
to let this defendant serve out his natural life in prison.  The people of the
state can be assured that he is no longer a threat.  The people of the state can
be assured that David Washington is not going to be on the streets; that David
Washington is not going to commit crimes.  On the other hand, the people of
the state do not have to have the moral judgment or the religious judgment on
their hands of having taken a human life.
I ask this Court from the bottom of my heart and on behalf of David Wash-
ington who I have represented for some months now to impose consecutive
sentences of life in the state penitentiary with no parole for twenty-five years
as to each of those consecutive sentences.248
The sentencing court thereafter gave Washington the death penalty in
each of the three cases, Pridgen, Birk, and Meli, to run
consecutively.249
Despite the foregoing, Justice O’Connor wrote, “[Tunkey] made a
strategic choice to argue for the extreme emotional distress mitigating
circumstance and to rely as fully as possible on [Washington’s] accept-
ance of responsibility for his crimes.”250  But neither before nor after
that comment did Justice O’Connor acknowledge the true scope of
Tunkey’s performance.  Absent from Strickland is any recognition
that Tunkey gave up on viable suppression motions.251  The opinion
likewise declines to discuss Tunkey’s shoddy sentencing memorandum
or his disjointed closing argument.  Worse yet, the Strickland opinion
does not confront Tunkey’s decision not to put on a case at Washing-
ton’s sentencing hearing.
But there’s more.
2. Character Evidence, Psychological Evidence, and Giving Up
on David Washington
Tunkey never had Washington examined by a psychologist or psy-
chiatrist.  Had Tunkey done so, he could have helped the sentencing
judge answer a key question: Why?  At the change of plea hearing, the
judge openly wondered why Washington would commit these crimes
and then so readily admit guilt.252  In other words, why would Wash-
ington—a person with no prior record,253 no history of substance
abuse,254 and no history of emotional problems255—suddenly snap
and go on a twelve-day crime spree that left three people dead?
248. Id. at 322–24.
249. Id. at 329.
250. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 699 (1984).
251. See supra notes 217, 222, and accompanying text.
252. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 50–59.
253. Id. at 51; see infra subsection III.A.3 (discussing the existence of Washington’s
rap sheet).
254. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 64, 137.
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Entering the sentencing hearing, Washington had undergone one
psychiatric evaluation performed by the State’s examiner.256  That
single interview concluded, in relevant part, that Washington “showed
no evidence of any psychosis at the time of the interview and there
was nothing from his description of the events surrounding the al-
leged offenses which would indicate that he was suffering from any
major mental illness at that time.”257  Washington had simple an-
swers.  He wanted a job, was unable to get one, and turned to crime as
a poorly thought-out solution to feed his family.258  Moreover, he be-
lieved strongly in the importance of admitting guilt and accepting
responsibility.259
But a subsequent psychiatric report260 and declarations from
Washington’s friends261 and family members262—none of whom testi-
fied at Washington’s sentencing hearing263—told a more detailed
255. Id. at 65.
256. Id. at 4–6 (providing a chronological list of relevant docket entries and page one
of the psychiatric evaluation).
257. Id. at 4.
258. Id. at 51–53.
259. E.g., id. at 69 (“I gave myself up because I was guilty.”).
260. Id. at 495–503.
261. Id. at 348–49 (Washington’s former employer); id. at 352–53 (Washington’s high
school band director); id. at 354–55 (Washington’s church president); id. at
356–57 (Washington’s adult choir director); id. at 358–59 (church secretary at
Washington’s church); id. at 360–61 (Washington’s former neighbor); id. at
362–63 (another former neighbor); id. at 365 (police officer who had known Wash-
ington for over ten years).
262. Id. at 338–39 (Washington’s grandmother, Lulu Parham); id. at 340–41 (Wash-
ington’s mother, Julia Taylor); id. at 342–43 (Washington’s brother, Clarence
Morgan); id. at 344–45 (Washington’s older sister, Renee Reed); id. at 346–47
(Washington’s younger sister, Diane Taylor).
263. Each of their affidavits stated some version of the following: “I would have been
willing to testify for David, but I was never contacted by anyone.” Id. at 341
(Washington’s mother); see, e.g., id. at 339 (Washington’s grandmother: “I would
have been willing to testify for David, but no one ever contacted me.”); id. at 343
(providing similar statement from Washington’s brother); id. at 345, 347 (includ-
ing similar statements from Washington’s sisters); id. at 349 (Washington’s for-
mer employer: “I would have been willing to testify about David’s background,
character and personality, but I was never contacted or interviewed by anyone in
connection with the case.”); id. at 353 (showing a similar statement by his high
school band director); id. at 355 (the president of the church Washington at-
tended: “I was in a position to provide evidence regarding David’s background,
character and personality, but I was never contacted or interviewed by anyone in
connection with David’s case.”); id. at 357 (recording a similar statement by
Washington’s choir director); id. at 361 (Washington’s former neighbor: “We have
discussed David and would have been willing to testify on David’s behalf, but
were never contacted or interviewed by anyone.”); id. at 365 (a former police of-
ficer: “I would have been willing to testify on David’s behalf about his back-
ground, character and personality at the time of sentencing, but I was never
contacted or interviewed by anyone at that time in connection with David’s
sentencing.”).
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story about Washington.  As a young black male with a tenth-grade
education, Washington was living in a Miami slum prior to the kill-
ings.264  Born in 1949 as the oldest of seven children,265 Washington’s
childhood was far from ideal; growing up, he was passed back and
forth between his mother and grandmother, and endured frequent se-
vere beatings from his stepfather.266  His stepfather’s sexual abuse of
Washington’s sister further marred his upbringing.267  Collectively, as
one of the examining psychiatrists hired by Shapiro later opined,
“[H]is childhood of emotional deprivation, severe physical abuse and
extreme violent actions towards him laid the groundwork for the re-
sentment and rage which was triggered by factors in his adult life over
which he felt he had no control . . . .”268
Yet, despite his troubled youth, Washington played snare drums in
his high school band, sang in the youth choir in church,269 enjoyed
playing basketball,270 and ultimately assembled a respectable em-
ployment history.  From 1968–1971, Washington worked at the
freight delivery department unloading tractors for Seaboard Airline
Railroad in Miami.271  His supervisor characterized him as a “very
good worker” who “eventually had to be laid off along with several
other employees.”272  After Seaboard, Washington had difficulty find-
ing steady work; he worked for Associated Grocers of Florida for
nearly a year from 1971–1972 and then at Burdines in Miami for parts
of 1973.273  Washington then worked briefly for the Miami Depart-
ment of Solid Waste, followed by Food Fair in Miami.274  He remained
at Food Fair until May 1, 1975, “when he was laid off for lack of
work.”275
By the age of twenty-five, Washington was married with one child
and placed on unemployment—a benefit that expired in 1976.276
Washington’s inability to obtain steady employment caused him to
slip into depression.277  The lights and water were shut off in his
264. Id. at 1, 3.
265. Id. at 495.
266. Id. at 6–7, 11; see id. at 496 (noting Washington had scars on his back and thighs
from the beatings).
267. Id. at 340 (declaration of Washington’s mother); id. at 497 (psychological exami-
nation by Dr. Jamal A. Amin).
268. Id. at 8.
269. Id. at 352–53.
270. Id. at 497.
271. Id. at 348.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 350–51.
274. Id. at 351.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 50.
277. DREHLE, supra note 133, at 134; see Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 3–4; see
also id. at 15 (according to psychiatric findings, “David was experiencing a high
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home, and his wife left him.278  Washington’s stress and desperation
peaked in September 1976—the month Washington began killing—
when his wife had their second child, but Washington, in his words,
“didn’t even have Pampers to put on my baby’s behind.”279
Judge Fuller, the sentencing judge, learned little about Washing-
ton from Tunkey’s representation.280  Tunkey later admitted that al-
though he made some preparations for a trial, he did not separately
prepare for Washington’s sentencing hearing at all.281  Tunkey there-
fore never obtained his own investigator,282 did not have Washington
independently examined by a psychiatrist or psychologist,283 did not
attempt to bring in character witnesses to testify,284 did not discuss
Washington’s childhood with his relatives (thus, did not learn about
Washington being abused as a child),285 and did not request a presen-
tencing report.286  In sum, beyond conversations with Washington,
Tunkey made no effort to save Washington’s life.287  Judge Fuller
therefore concluded with little difficulty that “[t]he defendant was not
suffering from the influence of extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance during the perpetration of the crimes outlined above and the
defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to requirements of law was not substantially
impaired.”288
Why did Tunkey do so little for Washington?  Tunkey would have
the chance to explain.  At a hearing on Washington’s subsequent fed-
eral habeas petition,289 Washington’s new lawyer, Richard Shapiro,
fascinatingly called Tunkey as his first witness.290  During his testi-
mony, Tunkey revealed two primary reasons why he made no effort to
save Washington’s life.  First and most alarmingly, contrary to Justice
O’Connor’s assertions in Part V, Tunkey did not think about a strat-
level of anxiety and sense of incompetence and frustration at the time the crimes
were committed”).
278. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 360.  During this time, Washington “entered a
series of illicit affairs, resulting in the conception and birth of several children.”
Id. at 498.
279. Id. at 50.
280. Judge Fuller admitted to learning new information about Washington during the
federal habeas hearing that he did not hear at sentencing. Id. at 463.
281. Id. at 374–77.
282. Id. at 378.
283. Id. at 384–85.
284. Id. at 388–89.  Tunkey thought these witnesses “superfluous” in light of Washing-
ton’s guilty plea. Id. at 430.
285. Id. at 390–91.
286. Id. at 404–05.
287. Id. at 397.
288. Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 663 (Fla. 1978).
289. The hearing took place April 9–10, 1981.  Brief of Petitioner Appendix, supra note
158, at 254.
290. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 372.
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egy.  In explaining why he did not request a presentence report,
Tunkey candidly remarked it was “perhaps lack of forethought” and
admitted, “I cannot say now, with hindsight that [ ] was a matter of
trial strategy . . . .”291
When asked why he did not seek a psychiatric or psychological
evaluation, Tunkey said that, to him, Washington “was sane.”292  Af-
ter being asked whether he viewed the question of sanity at trial as
equivalent to the death penalty mitigating circumstance of a defen-
dant’s ability “to appreciate the criminality of his conduct,”293 Tunkey
admitted, “I see where you are going.  Maybe I should have because
[Washington] said he had been out of work for six months and he had
impressed me as being sincerely concerned for the welfare of his wife
and child.”294  He later added, “I did not think at the time to go ahead
and utilize psychiatric or psychological experts . . . I did not think of
that.”295
The absence of psychological or psychiatric reports aside, it did not
even occur to Tunkey to request a continuance from the court to give
him additional time to prepare for sentencing296—despite a sentenc-
ing date set just five days after Washington pleaded guilty.297  And,
with regard to the brief sentencing memorandum he filed, Tunkey
could not explain why he conceded the applicability of certain aggra-
vating circumstances, while also conceding the inapplicability of cer-
tain mitigating circumstances.298
As for the second reason why he did so little, Tunkey explained
that he gave up when he found out that Washington confessed to the
Pridgen and Birk killings.  In Tunkey’s words, after seeing the confes-
sions, “I had a hopeless feeling.  There is no question about that.”299
He added: “I can honestly say that I don’t know that I felt that there
was anything which I could do which was going to save David Wash-
ington from his fate.”300  Finally, although it is not a mitigating cir-
cumstance in the 1975 Florida death penalty statute, Tunkey “felt
291. Id. at 405 (emphasis added).
292. Id. at 414.
293. Id. at 415.
294. Id. at 416.
295. Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
296. Id. at 400 (“As far as the time between the entry of the plea and affirmatively and
aggressively moving for a continuance really occurred to me.”).
297. Id. at 79 (providing date); Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 662 (Fla. 1978)
(providing sentence).  Judge Fuller later said this was “more time” than is nor-
mally provided prior to a sentencing in his courtroom. See Joint Appendix, supra
note 118, at 455.
298. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 411–14.
299. Id. at 384.
300. Id. at 400; see id. at 404 (“I really could find very little to address myself to in
terms of a relevant, cogent presentation of mitigating circumstances as outlined
in the statute itself . . . .”).
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that one of the mitigating circumstances ought to be the fact that
[Washington] was pleading guilty.”301
For these reasons, Justice Brennan was privately concerned.  He
wrote to Justice O’Connor on the same day she circulated her first
draft to express his concern about Tunkey’s performance while repre-
senting Washington.  Justice Brennan was specifically worried that
Justice O’Connor’s opinion equated Tunkey’s hopelessness with strat-
egy.302  Citing the findings made at the federal district court level,
Justice Brennan suggested there was “at least a strong possibility that
Tunkey’s decision [not to investigate potentially mitigating circum-
stances] was not the product of a strategy, but rather of a sense of
hopelessness.”303  He added:
I do not consider it ‘reasonable’ for counsel in a death case to make decisions
based on a feeling of hopelessness and frustration.  Indeed, it seems to me that
the worse the client’s plight, the more important it is that his lawyer acts
professionally and not on the basis of emotion.304
Thus, Justice Brennan suggested, “[I]t is hazardous for us to try to
apply the new standards to a cold record and determine for ourselves
the real basis for Tunkey’s decisions.”305
Against that disquieting backdrop, Justice O’Connor nonetheless
determined in Part V that it “is not difficult in this case” to conclude
“that the conduct of respondent’s counsel at and before respondent’s
sentencing proceeding cannot be found unreasonable.”306  Moreover,
even if Tunkey’s performance was unreasonable, it did not prejudice
the outcome.307  The Supreme Court was not the first to wrestle with
the prejudicial effect of Tunkey’s performance at Washington’s sen-
tencing hearing.  After Washington’s death sentences were affirmed,
Shapiro appealed a state trial court order denying his motion for post-
conviction relief to the Florida Supreme Court.308  In rejecting Sha-
piro’s claims by written opinion on April 6, 1981, the Florida Supreme
Court could “find no prejudice caused to appellant” and thus was “una-
ble to find merit in any of appellant’s arguments which assail his
sentence . . . .”309
Yet, in response to the federal habeas petition Shapiro filed, the
district court saw the case differently.  In a written order, the court
301. Id. at 403.
302. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Mar.
13, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William J.
Brennan Papers, Box 647, Folder 1(1)).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984).
307. Id. at 699.
308. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285, 286 (Fla. 1981).
309. Id.
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expressed “some concern” about Tunkey’s failure to investigate,310 his
failure to request a presentence investigation,311 and his failure to
present character witnesses.312  The court even concluded, “Mr.
Tunkey made an error in judgment” and “should have made an inde-
pendent investigation of factors relevant to mitigation, [which] would
have produced generally favorable information from family, friends,
former employers, and medical experts.”313  Like the Florida Supreme
Court, though, the district court was unable to find any prejudice to
Washington given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt,314 and
therefore denied the writ.315
Shapiro filed a motion for rehearing or a new trial,316 which was
denied,317 and he appealed to the Fifth Circuit—again arguing that
Tunkey provided ineffective assistance to Washington at sentenc-
ing.318  Shapiro found another receptive listening ear.  The Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed the district court on April 23, 1982, holding that the
district court employed the incorrect legal standard for evaluating
prejudice.319  After reconsidering the case en banc, Unit B of the Fifth
Circuit remanded to the district court because of that court’s failure to
make factual findings on whether Tunkey’s failures to investigate
were strategic and, if not, whether those failures were prejudicial.320
Like the Fifth Circuit, Justice Brennan was also concerned about
whether Tunkey’s performance prejudiced the outcome of Washing-
ton’s sentence.  As to Part V of Justice O’Connor’s Strickland draft
opinion, Justice Brennan plainly disagreed with her assessment of
whether Tunkey’s performance could have prejudiced the outcome of
Washington’s sentencing hearing.321  Justice Brennan wrote to her in
part as follows:
The sentencing judge had no explanation for Washington’s extraordinary con-
duct before him, nor was there any testimony from persons who knew the
defendant before his crime spree and who could explain what kind of person
he was.  All the sentencing judge had, as a result of Tunkey’s decision not to
investigate further, was Washington’s ‘apology.’  The fact that the sentencing
judge had virtually no information concerning Washington the man creates,
in my judgment, a reasonable doubt about the outcome that would not other-
310. Brief of Petitioner Appendix, supra note 158, at 261.
311. Id. at 280.
312. Id. at 281.
313. Id. at 282–83.
314. Id. at 285–86.
315. Id. at 294.
316. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 490.
317. Id. at 507.
318. Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
319. Id. at 901–02.
320. Id. at 1258–59.
321. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, supra
note 302.
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wise exist—or, to paraphrase your opinion, undermines my confidence in the
outcome.322
In response to Justice Brennan’s concerns about her analysis of the
prejudice prong, Justice O’Connor wrote that the evidence of nonstat-
utory mitigating circumstances—namely the evidence of Washing-
ton’s character—would not have made “any difference in the weighing
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances . . . .”323
Evidence of Washington’s character, however, was only part of Jus-
tice Brennan’s concern.  Indeed, the majority in Strickland declined to
address Washington’s history of physical and sexual abuse, as well as
Tunkey’s failure to learn about the abuse.324  But perhaps most troub-
ling is the psychological examination of Washington, unseen by the
sentencing court, which revealed that Washington, at the time of the
crimes, “suffered extreme emotional and mental distress which re-
sulted in a violent hysterical dissassociative reaction.”325  Apart from
excluding that conclusion, which bore directly on the “extreme mental
or emotional disturbance” mitigator in the 1975 Florida death penalty
statute,326 worse yet is Justice O’Connor dismissal of Tunkey’s admis-
sion that it never occurred to him to have Washington examined by a
psychologist.327
But there’s still more.
3. Washington’s “Rap Sheet”
Although the Supreme Court and two prior appellate courts made
much of the fact that Tunkey “excluded Washington’s ‘rap sheet,’”328
there was, in fact, no rap sheet to exclude.  Washington had no crimi-
nal history.329  How, then, did Washington’s non-existent rap sheet
take on a life of its own?  Here’s the rest of the story.
Washington testified at his change of plea hearing that “I have
been living right here in Dade County for eleven years and up until
September of this year [1976] I never was arrested in Dade County for
anything.  You fault me for the crimes I committed, but you got to go a
322. Id.  Justice Brennan again suggested remanding the case. Id.
323. Letter from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to Justice William J. Brennan, supra
note 201.
324. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 7, 11, 496.
325. Id. at 503.
326. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4)(b) (1975).
327. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 421.
328. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673, 676, 700 (1984); Washington v.
Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1247 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), rev’d, Strickland, 466
U.S. 668; Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285, 287 n.* (Fla. 1981).
329. Case Search for David Washington, MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, CLERK OF THE
CTS., https://www2.miami-dadeclerk.com/CJIS/CaseSearch.aspx, archived at
https://perma.unl.edu/8DBD-JVW2 (search “Defendant,” first name: “David,” last
name: “Washington,” date of birth: “12/13/1949”; then follow “Washington, David
L, B, M, 12/13/1949” hyperlink).
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little further back and see why I did commit these crimes.”330  He ad-
ded: “I never been in the Dade County Jail, nothing but a traffic viola-
tion.”331  Moreover, Washington said about killing Pridgen, “That is
the first time I committed a crime.”332
Yet, at the end of the State’s case, it nevertheless sought to intro-
duce “the defendant’s rap sheet.”333  Tunkey objected, noting, “I would
like to amplify that I object to [the State’s] comment that [it] wants to
introduce a so-called rap sheet . . . .”334  The sentencing court sus-
tained Tunkey’s objection, telling the State that “[t]here is an appro-
priate manner for establishing other convictions and this is not
it . . . .”335  The sentencing court, in pronouncing the sentence later,
said the following about Washington’s criminal history:
While there was no evidence admitted of prior convictions of the defendant,
he readily admitted that he had carried on a course of burglaries and had
stolen property for a significant period of time, thus eliminating Section
921.141(6)(a), Florida Statutes, as a mitigating circumstance.  The court finds,
however, that even if the defendant were considered to have had no signifi-
cant history of prior criminal activity, that the aggravating circumstances of
this case would still clearly far outweigh this factor of mitigation.336
Confusion about Washington’s criminal history continued during
his 1978 direct appeal from his death sentences to the Supreme Court
of Florida when, despite resisting his follow-up appointment,337
Tunkey remained his attorney of record.338  In relevant part, Tunkey
argued that the sentencing court failed to consider Washington’s ab-
sence of criminal history as a mitigating factor.339  In rejecting
Tunkey’s argument and affirming Washington’s death sentences, the
Florida Supreme Court reasoned:
[I]t appears from the record, and was recognized by the trial judge, that appel-
lant had carried on a course of burglaries and had stolen property for a signifi-
cant period of time.  In his confession in the Birk case appellant stated he had
committed a series of burglaries throughout Dade County and sold the stolen
merchandise to Katrina Birk and her husband.  He reiterated in open court
that he was selling “hot merchandise” to Katrina Birk.340
Whether, as the Florida Supreme Court believed, Washington ad-
mitted “a course of burglaries” and “reiterated in open court” that he
330. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 46.
331. Id. at 51.
332. Id. at 52.
333. Id. at 310.
334. Id. at 311.
335. Id. at 312.
336. Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 663 (Fla. 1978).
337. After pronouncing the sentence, the court sought to appoint Tunkey as appellate
counsel, though he resisted and requested another attorney be appointed so
Tunkey could be co-counsel.  Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 329–30.
338. Washington, 362 So. 2d at 660.
339. Id. at 666.
340. Id.
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had sold stolen merchandise to the Birks is debatable.  Although an
investigating detective, Detective Simmons, testified at Washington’s
sentencing hearing that he believed Washington committed several
neighborhood burglaries,341 Washington did not admit as much at his
plea hearing.  Rather, at that time, he indicated to the court his belief
that the Birks were a ripe target for a robbery because, in his words,
“they dealt with hot merchandise.”342  Washington added, “They had a
little shop set up.  It was more hot merchandise into this place than it
was legal merchandise.”343  Local newspapers reported, contrary to
the testimonies of both Detective Simmons and Washington, that the
Birks did not run a fencing operation; rather, they “ran frequent yard
sales.”344
Confusion about Washington’s criminal history persisted when
Shapiro appealed the trial court’s order denying his motion for post-
conviction relief to the Florida Supreme Court.345  The Florida Su-
preme Court rejected Shapiro’s complaint that Tunkey failed to prof-
fer evidence of Washington’s “good character and his emotional and
economic stress” prior to the killings in part because Washington had
already relayed to the court “this was his first encounter with the
law.”346  Confusingly, the court, in that same opinion, thereafter
praised Tunkey’s success in “preventing the introduction of appel-
lant’s ‘rap sheet.’”347
Clarity about Washington’s criminal history did not emerge after
Shapiro filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court on April
6, the same day the Florida Supreme Court denied relief and stayed
Washington’s execution.348  During the hearing on Shapiro’s federal
habeas writ, Shapiro asked Tunkey point-blank whether Washington
had a rap sheet.  The pair had the following exchange:
[Shapiro]:  Did you make any other effort to determine whether [Washington]
had ever been within the custody of the Department of Corrections or any
other custodial facility in Florida?
[Tunkey]:  As part of the discovery material which I had, I had been given a
copy of the FBI rap sheet by the prosecuting attorneys.  I think it might be
part of the record.
But in any event, my recollection is that even that revealed a lack of any
convictions and certainly incarcerations.  That is my recollection.349
341. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 200.
342. Id. at 37.
343. Id. at 37.
344. DREHLE, supra note 133, at 134.
345. Washington, 397 So. 2d at 286.
346. Id. (emphasis added).
347. Id. at 287 n.*.
348. Brief of Petitioner Appendix, supra note 158, at 254, 259.
349. Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 386 (emphasis added).  Confusingly, Tunkey
said at the hearing, “I think [Washington] did [have a prior conviction], but I
don’t think the rap sheet could prove it.” Id. at 427.
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Further evidence about the absence of any rap sheet came from an
independent psychological examination performed by Dr. Jamal A.
Amin on April 20, 1981.350  The report, filed in support of Washing-
ton’s federal habeas petition, noted:  “Despite the instability and acts
of violence against him [growing up], there are no reports of prior
crimes of violence nor of any drug or alcohol use by Mr. Washington,
normal outlets under such stress.”351
Despite substantial ambiguity about the existence of Washington’s
criminal history, Strickland nonetheless highlighted for the Supreme
Court in his opening brief that “defense counsel successfully excluded
the Defendant’s ‘rap sheet.’”352  Justice Powell’s clerk, Cammie R.
Robinson, remained skeptical about references to Washington’s sup-
posed rap sheet.  In a bench memorandum she authored for Justice
Powell dated December 30, 1983, she wrote, in response to Washing-
ton’s claim that Tunkey prejudicially failed to request a sentencing
hearing, that “such a request likely would have done more harm than
good . . . .”353  To support her conclusion, she wrote, “[A]ny
presentence report would have included [defendant’s] ‘rap sheet’ and
would have put before the judge all of defendant’s prior criminal activ-
ities.”354  Yet, in a troubling but telling footnote, Robinson admitted:
“I have not found any reference describing what if any prior criminal
acts were committed by defendant.”355
The so-called “rap sheet” nonetheless played a major role in Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Strickland: she highlighted its exis-
tence four times.356  First, at the outset of the opinion, she indicated
that Tunkey “successfully moved to exclude respondent’s ‘rap
sheet.’ ”357  Second, in justifying Tunkey’s failure to request a
presentence report, Justice O’Connor noted, “[A]ny presentence inves-
tigation would have resulted in admission of respondent’s ‘rap sheet’
350. Id. at 495.
351. Id. at 497.
352. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 164, at 21.
353. Bench Memorandum from Cammie R. Robinson for Justice Powell 6 (Dec. 30,
1983) (on file with author).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 6 n.1.
356. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673, 676, 699–700 (1984).
357. Id. at 673 (emphasis added).  To support the assertion, the opinion cites “A227;
App. 311.” Id. at 673.  The citations are unhelpfully circular.  Page 227 is the
petitioner’s appendix in support of his certiorari brief, which excerpts part of the
state court’s habeas opinion that states, “[U]pon objection by defense counsel,
[the court] refused the State’s request to admit the defendant’s ‘rap sheet’ at the
sentencing hearing.”  Brief of Petitioner Appendix, supra note 158, at 227.  Page
311 is a Joint Appendix page that includes Tunkey’s effort to strike the State’s
reference at sentencing to Washington’s criminal history.  Joint Appendix, supra
note 118, at 311.  Neither page actually supports the proposition that Washing-
ton, in fact, had a criminal history.
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and thus would have undermined his assertion of no significant his-
tory of criminal activity.”358  Third, in Part V, she observed: “Restrict-
ing testimony on respondent’s character to what had come in at the
plea colloquy ensured that contrary character and psychological evi-
dence and respondent’s criminal history, which counsel had success-
fully moved to exclude, would not come in.”359  Finally, also in Part V,
Justice O’Connor took aim at Washington’s claim that Tunkey should
have introduced character or psychological evidence on his behalf, not-
ing “admission of the evidence respondent now offers might even have
been harmful to his case: his ‘rap sheet’ would probably have been ad-
mitted into evidence . . . .”360
The idea that one of the most famous cases in the Supreme Court’s
history was in part built on a lawyer’s effort to exclude a document
that never existed is, in a word, disheartening.
B. The Disutility of Part V
Part V of the Strickland opinion was not always part of the Court’s
plan.  At the Court’s Conference following oral argument, a majority
agreed that, procedurally, the opinion should end by vacating the
Fifth Circuit’s decision and remanding for state court application of
the Court’s new standard.  Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s handwritten
conference notes reflect that Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and
Justice White all favored remanding.361  Justice Powell’s conference
notes indicate that Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Rehnquist also
voted to remand.362  Collectively, all but Justice O’Connor—and possi-
bly Chief Justice Burger363—voted in favor of having the district court
evaluate whether Tunkey’s representation was constitutionally defi-
cient pursuant to the Court’s new standard.364
Despite the Conference results, Justice O’Connor unilaterally de-
cided in her first draft on March 13, 1984, to include a section apply-
358. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 676 (emphasis added).  To support her reference to Wash-
ington’s rap sheet, Justice O’Connor again cited the petitioner’s appendix in sup-
port of his certiorari brief, though pages 226–28 are merely an excerpt of the state
court’s opinion.  Brief of Petitioner Appendix, supra note 158, at 226–28.
359. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699.
360. Id. at 700 (emphasis added).  Justice O’Connor offers no citation to support this
assertion.
361. Justice Blackmun Conference Notes (Jan. 13, 1984) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 401, Folder 9).
362. Justice Powell Conference Notes, supra note 190.
363. It is possible that Chief Justice Burger also favored remanding, but both Justice
Powell’s and Justice Black’s notes are ambiguous on this point. See id.; Justice
Blackmun Conference Notes, supra note 361.
364. According to Justice Powell’s notes, Justice O’Connor said it is “not necessary to
remand.”  Justice Powell Conference Notes, supra note 190.
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ing the Court’s new standard to Tunkey’s conduct: Part V.365  The
Court was both confused and concerned.  Justice Blackmun’s clerk,
Elizabeth Taylor,366 privately wrote a letter to him the next day and
nicely summarized the Court’s confusion: “[Part V] indicates that the
record shows . . . that the defense provided was the result of reasona-
ble professional judgment,” but “the District Court made a contrary
factual finding.”367  She likewise summarily noted concern about the
inclusion of Part V from Justices Stevens and Brennan.368  She con-
cluded her letter by recommending that Justice Blackmun “put pres-
sure on SOC to change the last section of the opinion” by authoring “a
public note urging that she reconsider remanding the case rather than
reversing outright.”369
Feedback from the Justices on Justice O’Connor’s first draft re-
flected, not surprisingly, a deep divide on whether Part V should be
included in the final opinion.  In his three-page letter on March 13,
1984, Justice Brennan told Justice O’Connor that he was “troubled by
Part V of [her] opinion.”370  Apart from the substantive concerns he
raised about her analysis of Tunkey’s performance, Justice Brennan
was concerned more basically about whether the Court was able to
apply its new standard to Washington’s case:
[Y]our opinion engages in its own assessment of the facts, and concludes that
none of the evidence Tunkey could have adduced rose to the level of ‘extreme
emotional disturbance.’  Whether any such evidence could have satisfied the
statutory mitigating factor is, however, a question of Florida law we are not
competent to resolve.371
This was not the first time Justice O’Connor heard this concern.
During oral argument, counsel for Strickland made her view clear
during a colloquy with Justice O’Connor that the Florida trial court’s
assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors was a determination
of Florida law.372
Justice O’Connor was not persuaded.  She responded to Justice
Brennan immediately by two-page letter also dated March 13.  In it,
365. First Draft of Strickland v. Washington Majority Opinion (Mar. 13, 1984) (on file
with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harry A. Blackmun Papers,
Box 401, Folder 8(2)).
366. The letter is signed only “Elizabeth,” but must have been authored by Elizabeth
Taylor, Justice Blackmun’s clerk during the 1983–84 Term. Harry A. Blackmun,
OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/justices/harry_a_blackmun?page=2#more (last visited
July 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/B9HP-FG5S.
367. Letter from Elizabeth Taylor to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Mar. 14, 1984) (on
file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harry A. Blackmun Pa-
pers, Box 401, Folder 9).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, supra
note 302.
371. Id.
372. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 171, at 4.
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she wrote that including Part V “is helpful because it gives a concrete
illustration of how the otherwise abstract principles articulated in the
opinion apply to one particular set of facts.”373  As to the Court’s abil-
ity to address Washington’s case, she added: “You suggest that it is a
question of Florida law whether the statutory mitigating circumstance
of extreme emotional disturbance could be found present on the prof-
fered evidence; if that is so, the matter is foreclosed by the Florida
courts’ negative answer to that question in this case.”374
Despite her response, divisions amongst the Court about Part V
persisted.  Chief Justice Burger, for example, wrote to Justice
O’Connor on March 14, 1984, joining her opinion and indicating that
he saw “no need to remand.”375  Justice Rehnquist also wrote to Jus-
tice O’Connor that day expressing his view that “without Section
V . . . the opinion is somewhat abstract and might mean a number of
things to a number of people.”376  He added, “I think the lower courts
will get a far better idea of what the opinion means if we ourselves
apply it to the facts of this case.”377  Justice Stevens, on the other
hand, shared Justice Brennan’s concerns.  In a letter to Justice
O’Connor dated March 22, 1984, he too expressed displeasure with her
inclusion of Part V because he believed the majority should “adhere to
the position taken by the majority at conference and remand for appli-
cation of the standard set forth in [her] opinion.”378  Finally, on March
23, Justice Powell wrote, “[W]e should decide Strickland.  It would be
helpful for the lower courts to have us apply the new standards.”379
373. Letter from Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to Justice William J. Brennan, supra
note 201.
374. Id.
375. Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
(Mar. 14, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harry
A. Blackmun Papers, Box 401, Folder 8(2)).
376. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Mar.
14, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William J.
Brennan Papers, Box 647, Folder 1(1)).
377. Id.
378. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Mar. 22,
1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William J.
Brennan Papers, Box 647, Folder 1(1)).
379. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor (Mar. 23,
1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Lewis Powell
Papers).
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Perhaps on the strength of Justices Blackmun’s,380 White’s,381 and
Powell’s382 simple desire to have Justice O’Connor join them in her
opinion, Justices Stevens and Brennan relented.383  Part V therefore
remained in the final draft.  But the Justices’ optimistic predictions—
that Part V would provide “helpful” guidance to lower courts—would
not pan out.  Even in the immediate aftermath of its publication,
lower courts struggled with Strickland in the 1980s.  Although a ma-
jority of courts adopted the Supreme Court’s approach,384 one court
rejected the decision outright,385 and others declined to fully adopt
both parts of the Supreme Court’s test.386  More importantly, adoption
of the Strickland standard hardly produced consistent results.387
380. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Mar.
26, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harry A.
Blackmun Papers, Box 401, Folder 8(2)).
381. Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Mar. 22,
1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Thurgood Mar-
shall Papers, Box 345, Folder 2).  Justice White had previously joined Justice
O’Connor’s opinion more informally on the day she circulated her first draft by
handwriting “please join me” on the draft’s first page.  First Draft of Strickland v.
Washington Majority Opinion (Mar. 13, 1984) (on file with the Library of Con-
gress, Manuscript Division, Byron R. White Papers, Box 636, Folder 2(1)).
382. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Mar. 23,
1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harry A. Black-
mun Papers, Box 401, Folder 8(2)) (“It would be helpful for the lower courts to
have us apply the new standards.”).
383. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (Mar. 28,
1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harry A. Black-
mun Papers, Box 401, Folder 8(2)); Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (May 9, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, William Brennan Papers, Box 647, Folder 2).  Why Bren-
nan changed his mind is a mystery. Berger, supra note 6, at 115 (calling Bren-
nan’s decision to concur “puzzling”).  Justice Marshall wrote “NO!!” on his copy of
Justice Brennan’s concurrence/dissent.  First Draft of Strickland v. Washington
Concurring Opinion (Mar. 28, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manu-
script Division, Thurgood Marshall Papers, Box 345, Folder 2).  He too seemed
confused by Brennan’s decision to join Justice O’Connor in applying the Strick-
land standard.
384. Todd R. Falzone, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: A Plea Bargain Lost, 28
CAL. W. L. REV. 431, 433 n.8 (1992) (citing cases).
385. State v. Smith, 712 P.2d 496, 500 n.7 (Haw. 1986).
386. Sanders v. Lane, 861 F.2d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988); Ex parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d
53, 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
387. Compare State v. Pitsch, 369 N.W.2d 711, 715–16 (Wis. 1985) (holding defen-
dant’s actions did not justify counsel’s failure to obtain his record or request a
hearing upon learning defendant wished to testify), and Johnson v. Kemp, 615 F.
Supp. 355, 359 (S.D. Ga. 1985) (noting counsel’s investigation was not “reasona-
bly designed to uncover available mitigation evidence”), with People v. Rogers,
497 N.E.2d 856, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding defendant’s failure to testify was
a matter of trial strategy, and there was no “reasonable probability that . . . trial
counsel’s representation was ineffective”); and Gainer v. State, 372 S.E.2d 848,
848–49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding attorney’s decision to avoid associating
his client with prior conflict may be considered a “sound trial strategy”).
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The passage of time failed to increase the consistency of Strick-
land’s applicability, and, as a result, the 1990s saw growing discon-
tent with Strickland among the judiciary.  Throughout the 1990s,
lower courts, for example, created their own standard,388 modified the
standard,389 or wholly rejected it.390  In the 2000s, lower courts con-
tinued to struggle with Strickland’s applicability to conflict-of-interest
cases,391 whether subsequent Supreme Court cases had modified its
standard,392 and whether Strickland properly applied to noncapital
sentences.393
Apart from the absence of “helpful” lower court guidance, a ware-
house full of research firmly indicates that Strickland failed to provide
any meaningful benchmark for the conduct of defense attorneys.394
The absence of meaningful defense representation is particularly pro-
nounced in death penalty cases.395  Part V, it would seem, was an ut-
ter failure.
388. People v. Claudio, 629 N.E.2d 384, 385–86 (N.Y. 1993).
389. State v. Steffensen, 902 P.2d 340, 343 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
390. Craig v. State, 825 S.W.2d 128, 129–30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
391. United States v. Esparza-Serrano, 81 F. App’x 111, 115 (9th Cir. 2003).
392. State v. England, No. 24637–6–II, 2001 WL 629393, at *3 n.5 (Wash. Ct. App.
June 7, 2001).
393. Davis v. Grigas, 443 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006).
394. See, e.g., Jane Fritsch & David Rohde, Lawyers Often Fail New York’s Poor, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at A1; Stephen Henderson, Defense Often Inadequate in 4
Death-Penalty States, MCCLATCHY DC (Jan. 16, 2007), http://www.mcclatchydc
.com/news/nation-world/national/article24460360.html, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/N2ET-PTFD; Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal De-
fense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581
(1986–1987); Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent
Defense: Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and
Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74–75
(1993–1994); Stephen B. Bright et al., Keeping Gideon from Being Blown Away, 4
CRIM. JUST. 10, Winter 1990, at 10–11 (1990).
395. ABA Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, Toward a More Just and Ef-
fective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, reprinted in 40 AM. U. L.
REV. 1, 48–60 (1990); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent
Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 334
(1995); Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The
Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 324–29 (1993); Anthony
Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of Sub-Minimum
Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43: RUTGERS L. REV. 281,
282–83 (1990–1991); Yale Kamisar, Gideon v. Wainwright: A Quarter Century
Later, 10 PACE L. REV. 343, 360–67 (1990); Ronald Tabak, Gideon v. Wainwright
in Death Penalty Cases, 10 PACE L. REV. 407, 407–12 (1990).  Perhaps separate
warehouses should exist to store the catalogue of stories confirming that same
conclusion in the more precise contexts of guilty pleas, trial, sentencing, and on
appeal.
Guilty Pleas: See, e.g., S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RTS., “IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD A LAW-
YER . . .” A REPORT ON GEORGIA’S FAILED INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSSTEM 35 (2003),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/7TWE-6E8P; Stephen B. Bright, Turning Cele-
brated Principles into Reality, 27 CHAMPION 6 (2003); Tara Harrison, The Pendu-
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C. Justice O’Connor’s Private and Unspoken War
How could one of the most famous criminal procedure cases in the
Supreme Court’s history produce such a malleable standard?  In doing
so, how could the Court omit so much critical information about
Tunkey’s performance?  The answer: Justice O’Connor cautiously and
quietly waged an unspoken war against the Warren Court’s broadly
defined right to counsel.  Or at least that’s what the story of Strick-
land, coupled with her opinions and voting pattern in right-to-counsel
cases, more than suggests.
A Reagan-appointee, Justice O’Connor became the first woman to
serve on the Supreme Court by replacing Justice Potter Stewart on
September 25, 1981.396  Over the course of Justice O’Connor’s time on
the bench, she participated in sixty-five right-to-counsel decisions—
sixty-four of which she heard during her time on the Supreme
Court.397  Her participation follows a bell curve that reflects a war for
lum of Justice: Analyzing the Indigent Defendant’s Right to the Effective
Assistance of Counsel When Pleading Not Guilty at the Plea Bargaining Stage,
2006 UTAH L. REV. 1185, 1192–93 (2006); Falzone, supra note 384, at 434.
Trial: See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: Death Sentence Not for
the Worst Crimes but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1839 (1994)
[hereinafter Bright, Worst Lawyer]; Bob Herbert, Op-Ed, In America: Cheap Jus-
tice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1998, at 15; Bill Rankin, Ruling Upholds Capital Case,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 18, 2001, at H4; Bill Rankin, Murder Case Botched, New
Lawyers Say Courts, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug 4, 1999, at B2; A Lawyer Without
Precedent, HARPER’S MAG., June 1, 1997, at 24; TEX. DEFENDER SERV., A STATE OF
DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 87–88 (2000) [hereinafter TEX.
DEFENDER SERV., A STATE OF DENIAL], archived at http://perma.unl.edu/M2TA-
VKQK.
Sentencing: See, e.g., Carter Center Symposium on the Death Penalty 14 GA. ST.
U.L. REV. 329, 341 (1998); Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon:
Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245,
248–49 (1991); TEX. DEFENDER SERV., LETHAL INDIFFERENCE: THE FATAL COMBI-
NATION OF INCOMPETENT ATTORNEYS AND UNACCOUNTABLE COURTS 36–38 (2002),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/VWU4-9ZJQ.
Appeal: See, e.g., Bright, Worst Lawyer, supra note 395, at 1861: TEX. DEFENDER
SERV., A STATE OF DENIAL, supra note 395, at 79; Marc Caputo, Justice Blasts
Lawyers over Death Row Appeals, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 28, 2005, at B5.
396. HUNTER R. CLARK, JUSTICE BRENNAN: THE GREAT CONCILIATOR 271 (1995).
397. In chronological order, Justice O’Connor heard the following right-to-counsel
cases during her time on the Supreme Court: Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982);
Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982);
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983); Oregon
v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984);
Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984); Strickland v. United States, 466 U.S. 668
(1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); United States v. Gouveia,
467 U.S. 180 (1984); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984); Evitts v. Lucey, 469
U.S. 387 (1985); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157 (1986); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Michigan v. Jackson, 475
U.S. 625 (1986); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Kuhlmann v. Wil-
son, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Kimmelman v.
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Justice O’Connor that began before Strickland, peaked with Strick-
land, and thereafter saw her recede from her right-to-counsel position,
generally consistent with the harsh position she took in Strickland.
Justice O’Connor heard seven right-to-counsel cases in her two
years on the Court prior to Strickland.  Of those, she authored two
majority opinions, and in all seven cases, she joined a majority that
declined to expand the right to counsel.398  In McKaskle v. Wiggins,
one of her two majority opinions during that span,399 the Court re-
jected a pro se defendant’s claim that standby counsel’s interference
during his trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to represent him-
self.400  Although standby counsel “intervened in a substantial man-
ner without Wiggins’ permission well over 50 times during the course
of the three-day trial,”401 a majority of the Court was unconcerned; it
noted, “[T]he primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a
fair chance to present his case in his own way.”402
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987); Penn-
sylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987);
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249
(1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429 (1988); Patterson
v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988); Cutillo v. Cinelli, 485 U.S. 1037 (1988) (dissenting
from the denial of certiorari); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); Perry v. Leeke,
488 U.S. 272 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); Murray v. Giarratano,
492 U.S. 1 (1989); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989); Powell v. Texas, 492
U.S. 680 (1989); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Michigan v. Harvey, 494
U.S. 344 (1990); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Lozada v. Deeds,
498 U.S. 430 (1991); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993);
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485
(1994); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994); Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452 (1994); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994); Ohio Adult Parole
Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998); Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23
(1999); Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152
(2000); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000); Daniels v. United States, 532
U.S. 374 (2001); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.
162 (2002); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654
(2002); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1
(2003); Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004); Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519
(2004); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605
(2005).
398. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 184; Barnes, 463 U.S. at 571; Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044;
Morris, 461 U.S. at 12; Torna, 455 U.S. at 587–88; Wyrick, 459 U.S. at 48–49;
Engle, 456 U.S. at 134.
399. She also wrote the majority opinion in Engle, 456 U.S. at 109.
400. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 184.
401. Id. at 191 (White, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 177.
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The Court’s opinion in Strickland came out just months after Wig-
gins.  The Court decided United States v. Cronic403—another effective
assistance-of-counsel case—on the same day as Strickland.  In Cronic,
a court-appointed young lawyer with a real estate practice was chosen
to represent a defendant and received just twenty-five days to investi-
gate his case.404  The Tenth Circuit found ineffective assistance of
counsel because those circumstances hampered counsel’s prepara-
tion.405  Justice O’Connor joined a majority of the Court in reversing
the Tenth Circuit because, “[The] case is not one in which the sur-
rounding circumstances make it unlikely that the defendant could
have received the effective assistance of counsel.”406  Interestingly,
the Cronic majority—unlike Strickland—remanded the case back to
the lower court for a determination of any “specific errors made by
trial counsel.”407
After Strickland, Justice O’Connor would not write another right-
to-counsel opinion until Moran v. Burbine408 nearly two years
later.409  During the interim time between Strickland and Burbine,
her opinion about the right to counsel began to shift.  In the Court’s
first two right-to-counsel cases post-Strickland, she voted with the
majority to oppose expansion of the right to counsel.410  Her votes in
those cases were the tenth and eleventh in a row, respectively,
wherein Justice O’Connor voted against the right to counsel.411  She
broke that voting pattern at the end of 1984 by voting to construe a
defendant’s request for counsel as unambiguous,412 and later agreeing
that due process guarantees effective assistance of counsel to defend-
ants on appeal.413
Justice O’Connor’s brief recession from her established voting pat-
tern initially seemed an anomaly.  At the end of 1985, she declined to
join a majority of the Court in Maine v. Moulton,414 which held that
the Sixth Amendment forbade introduction of a defendant’s incrimi-
nating statements recorded by his co-defendant post-indictment.415
403. 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (identifying the date of decision as May 14, 1984).
404. Id. at 649.
405. Id. at 650.
406. Id. at 666.
407. Id.
408. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
409. Compare Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (decided May 14, 1984),
with Burbine, 475 U.S. at 412 (decided March 10, 1986).
410. Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642 (1984); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S.
180, 192–93 (1984).
411. See supra note 397 and accompanying citations.
412. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 93 (1984).
413. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395 (1985).
414. 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).
415. Id. at 181 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor joined Parts I and III of
Chief Justice Burger’s dissent.
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Then, early in 1986, she joined Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in Nix v.
Whiteside,416 which reversed an Eighth Circuit holding that a defen-
dant’s attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel.417  The de-
fendant in Nix sought to elicit the cooperation of his attorney in
helping him commit perjury.418  In response, counsel in Nix
threatened to reveal the defendant’s plan to the trial court, which the
Eighth Circuit said wrongfully “constituted a threat to violate the at-
torney’s duty to preserve client confidences.”419  But the Supreme
Court thought otherwise, holding that counsel’s “admonitions to his
client can in no sense be said to have forced [defendant] into an imper-
missible choice between his right to counsel and his right to testify as
he proposed for there was no permissible choice to testify falsely.”420
That same year, Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion in
Moran v. Burbine.421  In Burbine, the defendant did not request a law-
yer to assist him during an interrogation about his participation in the
murder of a young woman.422  The defendant’s sister, however, re-
tained a lawyer for him, who “telephoned the police station and re-
ceived assurances that [defendant] would not be questioned further
until the next day.”423  Despite those assurances, law enforcement
proceeded with defendant’s interrogation and obtained inculpatory
statements from him that evening.424  Although the First Circuit
characterized the police conduct as “reckless,”425 Justice O’Connor,
writing for the Court, disagreed and held that law enforcement’s deci-
sion to question the defendant violated neither his Fifth nor Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.426  She reasoned, “Events occurring
outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him
surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and know-
ingly relinquish a constitutional right.”427
In 1986, a busy year for right-to-counsel issues, Justice O’Connor
dissented from the Court’s decision in Michigan v. Jackson428 to bar
admission of uncounseled incriminating statements taken from a de-
416. 475 U.S. 157, 159 (1986).
417. Id. at 163, 176.
418. Id. at 161.
419. Id. at 163.
420. Id. at 173.
421. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
422. Id. at 415.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 422.
426. Id. at 428–32.
427. Id. at 422.
428. 475 U.S. 625, 637 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor joined Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s dissent.  Importantly, the defendant in Jackson requested coun-
sel during his arraignment. Id. at 627 (majority opinion).
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fendant post-arraignment.429  And later, in Darden v. Wainwright,430
she voted with a majority of the Court to hold that counsel was not
ineffective pursuant to Strickland, despite spending only an hour-and-
a-half preparing for the punishment phase of a capital murder case.431
Days after Darden, she agreed in Kuhlmann v. Wilson that the Sixth
Amendment permitted introduction of statements a defendant made
to a police informant who shared his cell—even post-indictment—so
long as the officer did not act “deliberately to elicit incriminating
remarks.”432
Although her vote in Kuhlmann was her seventh in a row that fa-
vored limiting or otherwise restricting the right to counsel,433 she re-
versed course briefly in the Court’s next right-to-counsel case:
Kimmelman v. Morrison.  In Kimmelman, she joined a majority of the
Court in holding that counsel was ineffective by failing to file a timely
suppression motion premised on Fourth Amendment violations.434
The Court reasoned that counsel’s failure to file was “not due to stra-
tegic considerations”;435 rather, it was premised on a “startling igno-
rance of the law.”436  But her favoritism toward the right to counsel
was once again short-lived; months later she joined a majority of the
Court in Pennsylvania v. Finley, holding that prisoners have no consti-
tutional right to counsel “when mounting collateral attacks upon their
convictions . . . .”437  Her vote in Finley set off three more consecutive
votes to limit the right to counsel.438
The gentle post-Strickland recession from her approach to right-to-
counsel cases continued uninterrupted until her resignation in
2005.439  Indeed, between Finley in 1987 and Justice O’Connor’s final
right-to-counsel case in 2005, Halbert v. Michigan, the Court heard
and ruled on forty-one right-to-counsel cases.440  Of those forty-one,
429. Id. at 637 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
430. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
431. Id. at 184–85.
432. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986).
433. The seven consecutive votes occurred in: Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985);
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986);
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625; Darden, 477 U.S. 168; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478
(1986); and Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 436.
434. Kimmelman v.Morrison 477 U.S. 365, 385–87 (1986).
435. Id. at 385.
436. Id.
437. Pennsylvania v. Finley 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).
438. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163–64 (1988); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479
U.S. 523, 529–30 (1987); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 795–96 (1987).
439. William Branigin, Fred Barbash & Daniela Deane, Supreme Court Justice
O’Connor Resigns, WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, at A1.
440. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005);
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004); Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004);
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1 (2003); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002);
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002); Dan-
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Justice O’Connor voted to restrict or limit the right to counsel in
twenty-six of them.441  In other words, as she did in other areas,442
Justice O’Connor, during her time, evolved from a “classic conserva-
tive”443 at the outset into a Justice “neither consistently conservative
nor consistently liberal.”444
But that general review fails to uncover a more precise shift in Jus-
tice O’Connor’s post-Strickland views about defense counsel, which
surfaced in 2000.  In Williams v. Taylor,445 the first death sentence
overturned by the Supreme Court pursuant to Strickland, the defen-
dant made several admissions about his involvement in a robbery and
iels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001);
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000);
Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., 4th Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152 (2000);
Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23 (1999); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Wood-
ard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998); Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994); McFarland
v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (1994); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994); Davis
v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993);
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722
(1991); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.
407 (1990); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Michigan v. Harvey, 494
U.S. 344 (1990); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); Caplin & Drys-
dale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S.
680 (1989); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272
(1989); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S.
285 (1988); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of
Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429 (1988); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988);
Wheat, 486 U.S. 153; Barrett, 479 U.S. 523; Burger, 483 U.S. 776.  She also joined
Justice White’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Cutillo v. Cinelli, 485 U.S.
1037, 1037 (1988) (White, J., dissenting), and joined Justice Rehnquist in voting
to deny the petition in Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 432 (1991)—both of which
involved right to counsel issues.
441. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81; Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 11; Mickens, 535 U.S. at 179; Bell,
535 U.S. at 697–98; Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173; Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477; Smith,
528 U.S. at 278; Martinez, 528 U.S. 152; Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289; Davis, 512
U.S. at 459; Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 372; Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399; Coleman, 501
U.S. at 732; McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178; Butler, 494 U.S. 407, 415; Harvey, 494 U.S.
354; Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614; Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 618; Murray, 492
U.S. at 6; Perry, 488 U.S. at 280; Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 211; Patterson, 487 U.S.
at 291; Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164; McCoy, 486 U.S. at 435; Kemp, 483 U.S. at
795–96; Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529.
442. That pattern generally mirrors her voting trends in other areas. E.g., Tom
Curry, O’Connor Had Immense Power as Swing Vote, MSNBC, http://www
.nbcnews.com/id/5304484/ns/us_news-the_changing_court/t/oconnor-had-im-
mense-power-swing-vote/#.U5dUyC_IaC8 (last updated July 1, 2005, 10:33 AM),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Z63R-X9JV.
443. Abigail Perkiss, A Look Back at Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s Court Legacy,
YAHOO! NEWS (July 1, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/look-back-justice-
sandra-day-o-connor-court-094809112.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
ZUT6-9BC2.
444. Warren Richey, As O’Connor Votes, So Tilts the Supreme Court, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 30, 2003, at 1.
445. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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murder.446  At the sentencing hearing following his conviction, the
prosecution introduced the defendant’s substantial prior criminal his-
tory, which included convictions for armed robbery, burglary, grand
larceny, arson, and violent assaults on elderly victims.447  Defendant’s
counsel introduced “testimony of [the defendant’s] mother, two neigh-
bors, and a taped excerpt from a statement by a psychiatrist.”448
The Court held that counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel at sentencing by failing to prepare an adequate investiga-
tion.449  In particular, the Court found counsel failed to uncover defen-
dant’s abusive and “nightmarish childhood,” declined to introduce
evidence that defendant was “ ‘borderline mentally retarded’ and did
not advance beyond sixth grade,” and “failed to seek prison records
recording [the defendant’s] commendations for helping to crack a
prison drug ring . . . .”450
Justice O’Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion agreeing, in
particular, with the majority’s Strickland analysis.451  Fascinatingly,
she chastised the lower court’s “obvious failure to consider the totality
of the omitted mitigation evidence”452—the very type of evidence she
herself discounted in Strickland.453  Although she readily concluded
in Strickland that omitted character evidence could not satisfy the
prejudice component,454 Justice O’Connor suggested in Williams that
it was “impossible to determine” whether the lower court’s error “af-
fected its ultimate finding that Williams suffered no prejudice.”455
She therefore favored the very procedural outcome she emphatically
opposed in Strickland: Remand.456
A 2001 speech Justice O’Connor gave to a group of female lawyers
in Minnesota perhaps explains her dramatic about-face.457  Despite
being a longtime supporter of the death penalty, she admitted during
her remarks, “[T]he system may well be allowing some innocent de-
446. Id. at 367–68.
447. Id. at 368.
448. Id. at 369.
449. Id. at 395.
450. Id. at 396.
451. Id. at 415–16 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
452. Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
453. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 699 (1984) (“Trial counsel could reasona-
bly surmise from his conversations with respondent that character and psycho-
logical evidence would be of little help.”).
454. Id. at 699–700.
455. Williams, 529 U.S. at 414 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
456. Id. at 416.
457. Editorial, Justice O’Connor on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A16.  The
speech generated substantial media interest. See, e.g., O’Connor Questions Death
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001; O’Connor Questions Death Penalty, ABCNEWS
.COM (July 3, 2001, 11:07 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=92961.
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fendants to be executed . . . .”458  She partially blamed the quality of
defense representation, noting that Texas defendants who could afford
private attorneys were less likely to be convicted compared with those
who were appointed counsel.459  Astonishingly, she added: “Perhaps
it’s time to look at minimum standards for appointed counsel in death
cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when they are
used . . . .”460
After those remarks, she would participate in nine more cases that
raised a right-to-counsel issue.  Not only did her voting pattern con-
tinue to shift aggressively in favor of right-to-counsel expansion, so too
did her views about Strickland.  As to the former point, Justice
O’Connor, in her final right-to-counsel cases, wrote to allow right-to-
counsel challenges as the only basis to collaterally attack a federal
sentence following an Armed Career Criminal Act conviction,461 voted
to expand the provision of counsel to indigents who receive a sus-
pended sentence that could result in prison time,462 wrote to suppress
uncounseled statements taken in violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment,463 and voted in favor of providing counsel to indigent defend-
ants appealing convictions secured by guilty plea.464  Importantly, two
of those four cases were decided by the slimmest of margins—a 5–4
vote465—where Justice O’Connor presumably served as the swing
vote.466
As to the latter point, Justice O’Connor’s views about Strickland
emerged with increasing clarity during her final nine right-to-counsel
cases.  In Wiggins v. Smith,467 she considered defense representation
similar to Tunkey’s representation of Washington.  Following defen-
dant Wiggins’ conviction for first-degree murder, robbery, and theft,
the question turned to whether he should receive the death pen-
alty.468  Counsel for Wiggins moved to bifurcate sentencing in order to
458. Editorial, supra note 457 (internal quotation marks omitted).
459. Id.
460. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
461. Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 382 (2001).
462. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002).
463. Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524–25 (2004).
464. Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610 (2005).
465. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 656 (noting Court composition and opinion breakdown); Dan-
iels, 532 U.S. at 375 (same).
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Bazelon, The Swing Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006.  For example, five of the last
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5–4 votes.  Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 376 (2005); Shelton, 535 U.S. at 656;
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(2001); Daniels, 532 U.S. at 375.
467. 539 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (noting Court composition and opinion breakdown).
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retry certain factual aspects of the case and then present a mitigation
case, “if necessary . . . .”469  Sentencing proceedings commenced after
the court denied counsel’s motion.470  During opening argument, coun-
sel suggested the sentencing jury consider Wiggins’ background and
upbringing, but never introduced evidence of his life history during
the proceedings.471  Apart from these deficiencies, counsel’s investiga-
tion drew only from a presentencing investigation and records kept by
the Baltimore Department of Social Services.472  Wiggins received the
death penalty.473
During subsequent appellate proceedings, counsel admitted that
he “did not remember retaining a forensic social worker to prepare a
social history, even though the State made funds available for that
purpose.”474  Rather, he elected to focus on “retry[ing] the factual case
and disputing Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the murder.”475  Jus-
tice O’Connor acknowledged the similarities between this case and
Strickland,476 but reached a different outcome: “Counsel’s investiga-
tion into Wiggins’ background did not reflect reasonable professional
judgment.”477  She reasoned that counsel’s investigation “was neither
consistent with the professional standards that prevailed in 1989, nor
reasonable in light of the evidence counsel uncovered in the social ser-
vices records—evidence that would have led a reasonably competent
attorney to investigate further.”478
Turning to the prejudice inquiry, Justice O’Connor concluded,
“[H]ad the jury been confronted with [the] considerable mitigating evi-
dence, there is a reasonable probability that it would have returned
with a different sentence.”479  To reach her prejudice conclusion, she
referenced Wiggins’ absence of prior convictions: “Wiggins’ sentencing
jury heard only one significant mitigating factor—that Wiggins had
no prior convictions.  Had the jury been able to place petitioner’s ex-
cruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a
reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a dif-
ferent balance.”480  The Wiggins Court, for only the second time, inval-
idated a death sentence pursuant to Strickland.481
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 523.
473. Id. at 516.
474. Id. at 517.
475. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
476. Id. at 521.
477. Id. at 534.
478. Id.
479. Id. at 536 (alteration in original).
480. Id. at 537.
481. Marcia Coyle, New Standards in Death Penalty Cases Predicted, N.J. L. J., July
28, 2003, at 18.
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Justice O’Connor amplified the message that her views about
Strickland had firmly changed in the final ineffective-assistance case
she heard on the Court.482  In Rompilla v. Beard, two public defenders
represented the defendant during both the guilt and punishment
phases.483  Following his conviction for murder, defense counsel intro-
duced minimal mitigation evidence in the form of testimony from five
of the defendant’s family members.484  The defendant received the
death penalty and, during a series of appeals, argued that counsel
failed “to present significant mitigating evidence about [his] child-
hood, mental capacity and health, and alcoholism.”485  The Supreme
Court agreed and held that even when a defendant’s family suggests
otherwise, a “lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and
review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely
on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial.”486
Rompilla was the third case to overturn a death sentence pursuant
to Strickland.  As yet another 5–4 case, Justice O’Connor’s vote was
critical.  Perhaps sensing as much, she wrote a separate concurring
opinion highlighting the importance of counsel investigating the cir-
cumstances behind a defendant’s prior criminal history.487  She ob-
served that in this case, counsel’s “failure to obtain the critical file
‘was the result of inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment.’”488
Apart from her ironic focus on the importance of investigating crimi-
nal history (recall that Washington had none), Justice O’Connor chas-
tising counsel’s “inattention” tidily rounds out her Strickland
journey—a journey that began with approval of conduct by an attor-
ney who admittedly gave up on his client.489
Two years after her resignation, Justice O’Connor gave a speech as
part of a conference on Strickland.490  She admitted “that what we
have with the Strickland Standard is not answering all the questions
that need to be answered,”491 and therefore suggested the Supreme
Court revisit the case.492  If Strickland’s own author thinks it’s time to
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483. Id. at 377–78.
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revisit the standards governing defense attorney competency, then the
time for the Supreme Court to do so is surely overdue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Warren, during his tenure on the Court, worked to
establish a broad and robust right to counsel for indigent defend-
ants—one that hardly depended on the Sixth Amendment alone.
Rather, the Warren Court relied on the Due Process Clause, the Fifth
Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause in order to expand ac-
cess to counsel at trial, during lineups, on appeal, and in the interro-
gation room.  But the Warren Court never addressed the minimum
competency required of counsel in each of those contexts.  Its failure to
do so turned out to be momentous.
The close of the Warren Court saw a change in Court personnel.
One new Justice in particular—Justice O’Connor—had a vision at the
outset of her tenure of the right to counsel that differed greatly from
her predecessors.  That vision is best exemplified by her majority opin-
ion in a case that struck back against the Warren Court: Strickland v.
Washington. Strickland ostensibly sought to provide “helpful” gui-
dance to lower courts by defining competency requirements for de-
fense counsel.  But the passage of time has softened Justice
O’Connor’s views.  Even she believes the time is ripe for a break away
from Strickland: “We have to make some modifications and some judg-
ments that will adjust it . . . .”493
493. O’Connor, supra note 491.
